Abstract

In the course of the cultural and social turn the problem of the translation unit has been widely marginalized by the attention towards other problems. However, the increasing interest of different disciplines in translation processes occurring in the context of academia and philosophy presses translation studies to (re)consider this issue giving rise to the following questions: What are the crucial translation units which trigger the transformation of a thought collective or the transfer of a thought style (Fleck)? What is the relationship between translation processes on the micro-level of the scientific text and the “transfer” of philosophical thought or the transformations within knowledge cultures? In order to understand the actual contribution of translators to the production of science, it is not enough to acknowledge that certain texts have been translated or not, and by whom. To gain insight into the agency of translators in academic discourse, it is indispensable that we look for their actual philosophical or scientific creativity. With this in mind, the article will focus on the most dense part of philosophical works with regard to technical terminology, namely the glossary. There, micro-structural translation units are concentrated and veritably “put on display”. The aim is to show how this site of terminological meticulousness opens up for the translator a sphere of influence and creativity in the sense of knowledge production.

Key words: translation unit, circulation of knowledge, philosophical translation, Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, glossary, terminology
Lavinia Heller

Where does philosophy take place in translation?
Reflections on the relevance of microstructural translation units within philosophical discourse

Translated by Charleton Payne

Introduction

The question and the debates about what gets translated, or can or even should be translated, has always informed the history of reflection on translation. It has been passed down to us since antiquity, since at least Cicero’s credo non verbum pro verbo. In modern translation studies, this problem ultimately comes to a head in the term translation unit (TU). After its discursive boom in the waters of the equivalency debate in the nineteen-sixties to -eighties, however, the conceptual interest in the TU clearly declined in the course of the cultural turns. One of the most effective caesuras in this debate was the argument announced by Bassnett and Lefevere in their “manifesto” (BASSNETT 1998: 123) from 1990: “neither the word nor the text, but the culture becomes the operational ‘unit’ of translation” (BASSNETT & LEFEVERE 1990: 8). Since then the concept of the TU has been successively widened, and increasingly more comprehensive discourse formations, stocks of knowledge, social practices, and even entire cultural life-forms are now classified as TU (BACHMANN-MEDICK 2016).

In light of this development, the fixation of microstructural units on the terminological or lexical level, as is characteristic for many studies of the translation of scientific and philosophical texts, seems downright regressive. Here, discussions frequently revolve around the intensional and extensional amount of individual concepts, around the discursive ‘predisposition’ of specific terms which designate, or for that matter cannot designate, concepts (for such ‘predispositions’ in academic discourse vary in

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different languages), or around terminological idiosyncrasies and their (zero-)equivalence in the target language (see for example Albert 2001: 207ff., 214ff.; Michel 1999, 2000; Wenzel 2015: 64ff.). This focus on the microstructural level sometimes makes studies conducted by translation scholars appear narrow-minded and insipid next to the ‘large-scale’ reconstructions of studies on the dissemination of knowledge and the transformation of academic cultures, traditions, and styles of reflection in the history of science.

In this article it is precisely this prejudice that I would like to challenge. To this end, I will shift our attention to the most minute translational unities which, in part, are discoverable even below the level of single terms, on the level of individual morphemes. The goal of such an archeological excavation is to gain a more precise view into the complex relationship between translational action and the transfer, transformation, and construction of philosophical ideas and convictions. In so doing, I am taking up the main conviction of Olohan and Salama-Carr’s special issue Science in Translation (The Translator), namely that the significance of translators is not only limited to the dissemination of scientific discourse but, much more, that they participate in the “constitution of scientific discourse itself” (Olohan & Salama-Carr 2011: 187). In order to understand the actual contribution of translators to the production of science, it is not enough to contentedly acknowledge that certain texts have been translated or not, and by whom. To gain insight into the agency of translators in academic discourse, it is indispensable that we look not for their stylistic room for manoeuvring but for their actual philosophical or scientific creativity. To this end, I would like to focus on the most dense part of philosophical works with regard to technical terminology, namely the glossary. The glossary is the designated place where micro-structural translation units are concentrated and veritably ‘put on display’, as well as where the philosophical contribution of the translator would seem at first glance to least find expression. In what follows, I will show how, contrary to such assumptions, this site of terminological meticulousness in fact opens up for the translator a sphere of influence and creativity in the sense of knowledge production.

The following discussion will first allay the concern that the focus on the linguistic aspect of translation processes in academic discourse could ‘trivialize’ the object of analysis. In a second step, I situate the glossary, which is primarily treated in the discourse of translation studies (TS) as a lexicographical problem, rather as a philosophical problem. Finally, using the example of a concrete glossary, I will show in what ways this text offers the translator space for philosophical creativity and thereby attains a hermeneutic function for the reading of a philosophical text.

Reevaluating the linguistic character of translation

From a pragmatist view, the dissemination and transformation of knowledge cannot be grasped independently of translational actions on the micro-structural level – even if changes in academic cultures cannot be explained, without remainder, with reference to individual translational decisions. Such intercultural movements of transfer and transformation are ultimately first constituted by the translation and the aca-
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demic processing of translated texts, text parts, quotations and theses. In such operations of academic processing, single micro-structural translation units are diffused in the form of terms and concepts that are built into the targeted or international academic discourse through their use. Indeed, the long-term ‘side effects’ of recurrent processes of translation between certain language pairs or within certain discourses are not in the first place observable in the transfer and transformation of thought styles and traditions of a thought collective (Fleck 1979) or whole stocks of knowledge. They can already be found in the construction and expansion of specific language games (Wittgenstein), including their rules of argumentation. The transformation of such language games in turn generates new possibilities and conditions for translation and hence unhesitatingly determines the circulation of knowledge over and beyond linguistic borders. A particularly notorious example of this phenomenon is the Latin language of ancient philosophy, which is considered the result of the systematic translation of Greek philosophy by Cicero (Eucken 1879/1964). A currently much-discussed example is the influence of translations from and into English on the development of ‘minor’ languages of science (Oduwole 2010; Sharkas 2011; Bennett 2006, 2007, 2015; but even already Ohly 1981). Only in recent years has TS become more aware of the homogenization and “colonization of discourse” (Bennett 2011: 196), which goes along with the praxis of translation, and occasionally raised the question of which possibilities, if any at all, translators might have for countering these homogenizing tendencies (see above all Bennett 2006, 2011, 2015). The recognition of translators as “potent actors in the globalization of knowledge” (Montgomery 2010: 303) is grounded on the insight into this influence of translation and discursive structures. At the same time, at precisely the point where the significance of the translator is acknowledged, the linguistic aspect of the translation is often played down, for “translation, in science as elsewhere, is not merely a linguistic

2 Fleck defines a thought collective “as a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or maintaining intellectual interaction” (Fleck 1979: 39). Thought collectives differ in terms of a certain thought style identified by “a given stock of knowledge and level of culture” (ibid.) and specific methodological “habits”. In this sense, the thought style is defined “as [the readiness for] directed perception, with corresponding mental and objective assimilation of what has been so perceived. It is characterized by common features in the problems of interest to a thought collective, by the judgment which the thought collective considers evident, and by the methods which it applies as a means of cognition. The thought style may also be accompanied by a technical and literary style characteristic of the given system of knowledge” (ibid.: 99, emphasis in original). Constitutive for the thought style is that “[i]t becomes natural and, like breathing, almost unconscious, as a result of education and training as well as through his participation in the communication of thoughts within his collective” (Fleck 1979: 141). Against this backdrop, language, the usage of a particular terminology, takes on a vital role in both the stabilization and the transformation of a particular thought style.

3 This topic is also central for the discussion that has been conducted in recent years under the banner of “de-Westernization” and “internalization” of TS. See the discussion forum on “Universalism in translation studies”, which was held in 2014 in issues 7:1 and 7:3 of the journal Translation Studies. See also Tymoczko 2009. The critical debate was already initiated however in 2002 by Susam-Sarajeva with her essay “A ‘Multilingual’ and ‘International’ Translation Studies?”.
process, but a form of personal engagement” (MONTGOMERY 2010: 304, emphasis added). However, the great challenge of translation in the academic context is still in fact situated at the linguistic and terminological level, and this is even true for those approaches which are concerned primarily with macro-structural aspects of the academic translation.

[...] [Because science] depends heavily upon highly specialized and ever expanding technical vocabularies, a challenge to every translator. Inaccurate rendering of even few terms can mar a translation’s usefulness significantly. The coining of new terms by researchers, moreover, is ongoing as a measure of scientific advance, involving new discoveries and development of new subdisciplines, thus presenting ever new demands upon translators. (MONTGOMERY 2010: 302)

Yet in light of the impact of translations in academic discourse, Montgomery, although he is constantly preoccupied with terminological precision, sees translational work as inadequately defined, when it is defined merely as “a matter of rendering the words of one language into those of another, hopefully with little or no spillage of meaning” (2000: 3).

This ambivalence implies a concern that the linguistic dimension of translation alone is too weak to prove the relevance of translation. Whoever regards translation from a linguistic standpoint is actually suspected of quickly losing sight of the essential. The implicit allegation is that translational micro-units like words or terms are ultimately insignificant for the cultural, social, or academic event. In what follows I will counter this concern by providing insight into the relevance of micro-structural translation units, not only for an accurate transfer but also for the creation of philosophical thought. I will elaborate my considerations with reference to an extreme example of terminological esotericism, namely the Index zu Heideggers ‘Sein und Zeit’ (henceforth Index) to Heidegger’s opus maius Sein und Zeit [Being and Time] first published in 1927, as well as its counterpart Lessico di ‘Essere e tempo’ (2006) appended to the most recent Italian translation by Alfredo Marini, which was published fifty-three years after the first Italian translation of Sein und Zeit by Pietro Chiodi (1953). The first Italian translation of Sein und Zeit encouraged a specific Heidegger interpretation in Italy that bears strong accents of French Existentialism that have been traced back to Chiodi’s orientation toward the French Heidegger reception and translation and have been duly criticized (see for example LAZZARI 2000: 118ff.; MARINI 2000a: 17, 24-25, 2002). In fact, it was, among others the existentialist terminology of his predecessor that urged Alfredo Marini to retranslate Sein und Zeit (MARINI 2006b). Yet the necessity for a new translation does not seem to have been felt so strongly by everyone. Indicative of this is that even one year before the appearance of Marini’s version, Chiodi’s translation was re-published by Longanesi without substantial revisions. Not only did the old translation apparently still enjoy acclaim at the time when the new translation appeared, but it is still very much in demand today and is by now even available as an e-book. Chiodi’s Heidegger terminology has moreover solastingly shaped the language of Italian philosophy as a whole, such that its transmission in certain respects is no longer dependent on the reception of Chi-
odi’s *Essere e Tempo*: philosophy is already spoken, so to say, in Chiodi’s terms (Bianco 1989; Lazzari 2000: 118; Lombardi 2006; Volpi 2010). Marini had indeed anticipated the philosophical and terminological persistency of his predecessor’s translation as a problem for the reception and acceptance of his own work. This explains his unusual approach of acquainting the scientific community, through different essays, with his translation method and solutions to individual problems of translation, already before the publication of the entire translation (Marini 2000a, 2000b, 2002; Lazzari 2000). As we will see below, Marini even used the glossary as a translation strategy to thwart the Heidegger tradition that had been established in Italy through the practice of philosophizing with Chiodi’s Heidegger terminology.

Before we plunge into the depths of terminological extravagances and strategic translation manoeuvres, however, I would like to comment on my own word usage: a clear distinction between “glossary” and “index”, as is relevant elsewhere, is unnecessary here. The *Index to Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’* is in any case a hybrid. For the reader not only finds in it explanations of the terms indexed there, as is to be traditionally expected from a glossary; but also, as with a classical index, the reader is referred to those passages in the main work in which key words appear. As we will see, the philosophical hermeneutic potential of the *Index*, above and beyond its explicative function, is grounded in precisely this hybrid character. In order to avoid misunderstandings, I will henceforth refer to the German *Index zu Heideggers ‘Sein und Zeit’* with the italicized and capitalized “*Index*”. Otherwise, I use “glossary” and “index” synonymously, insofar as a distinction does not arise out of a given context. All citations from the *Index* are translated by Charlton Payne (C.P.).

(Re)situating the glossary as a (philosophical) research object in TS

With the growing sensibility for the translator’s authorship, or his or her (in)visibility in the translated text in the nineteen-nineties (Venuti 1995), the interest of TS, fed mostly by readings of Gérard Genette, for paratextual phenomena such as prefaces and afterwords, footnotes and endnotes, primarily as a resonance space for the translator’s voice in the literary text, has not grown rapidly but it has at least been on a continual rise (Hermans 1996; Tahir- Gürcaglar 2002; Sardin 2007; Dimitriu 2009; Elefante 2012; Jansen & Wegener 2013). Comparatively restrained, on the other hand, is the interest for the paratext in the realm of philosophical and scientific texts (Sanchez 2011; Sharkas 2011; Jooker & Rooryck 2013; Kühne 2015). This might be due, among others, to the fact that paratextual elements are in principle more expected of academic than they are of literary texts and are thus less likely to attract particular attention. Among all the forms of the paratext, the glossary and the index would seem to have received the least amount of attention in both literary and scientific as well as technical fields of TS.4 The discussion of these paratexts has at

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4 The lack of interest might have to do with the fact that Genette (as the most important point of theoretical orientation in the discussion) seems to be interested in neither the glossary nor the index, even if these texts can without a doubt be discussed in terms of his definitional criteria of the
least been very one-sided, and has certainly not been drawn to the possibilities which this type of text holds for the ‘intervention’ of the translator. While the glossary absolutely belongs among the objects of TS, it seems to only get discussed from the point of view of lexicography, or with reference to its explicating function. As a result, the focus is mostly on problems or possibilities for the production of specialist glossaries and terminological data banks for facilitating the praxis of translation or multilingual communication in economic, juridical, technical as well as academic and natural science fields (see STRAKER 2007; HEBENSTREIT et al. 2009; JIANG 2013). In fact, a glossary is expected to assist the recipient while reading a specific text by providing terminological clarifications. This is probably why glossaries and indexes are usually not translated, but are instead created anew on the basis of the translated text and taking into consideration the habits of thought within their target culture as well as the prior knowledge in a specific discursive field. Just how ‘normal’ this praxis is, is revealed time and again by the fact that the reader of the target text is not even made aware of this translational omission. There seems to be a tacit agreement that the glossary should be considered as merely an additional rather than an integral part of the unit to be translated.\(^5\) In the following section I will take a closer look at the relationship of the Index to Sein und Zeit. There will be much to be said for considering the glossary as an integral component of Sein und Zeit and to appreciate it thus as a philosophical rather than a purely technical lexicographic site of the opus.

**The Index and Sein und Zeit**

Due to its notorious linguistic extravagance, Sein und Zeit was received internationally as “scandalo linguistico” (GARRONI 1989: 22) and has been considered since its appearance as an “archetype of untranslatability” (ALBERT 2001: 194). Indeed, there is hardly another work for which there are so many reports of desperate and frustrated translators and whose terminology has been so fervently discussed ever since its translational processing. Heidegger, according to Arkadiusz Zychlinski’s summary of international translation frustration, is “hell for translators” (2006, 180). The size of the German glossary alone, which encompasses 121 pages, speaks for itself and heralds a mighty terminological challenge for translators. At first glance, the Index seems to have a relatively independent character vis-à-vis the main text. For one, its first appearance occurs only in 1961, i.e. not until thirty-four years after the first publication of Sein und Zeit in 1927 and it appears as its own volume with its own preface to its different editions. Secondly and more importantly, it is edited not by Heidegger himself but by another author, Hildegard Feick, who, according to Heidegger, “gave the index its own form” (Heidegger 1980: V). Despite this distance to the material and the (apparently) distinct authors, the Index and Sein und Zeit, as well as

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\(^5\) Without showing particular interest in the glossary, Schreiber had already addressed in the nineteen-nineties the question of which paratextual elements (prefaces and afterwords, footnotes and endnotes) should be considered as elements of the translation and which not, and he called attention to the difficulty of defining the parameters for such classification (1993: 233-36).
Heidegger, remain not only inseparably linked but also reliant upon one another. To begin with, the glossary derives its legitimacy from the co-existence of the main text, as its function is to explain the terms used there. This relationship of dependency and the question of authorship acquires a special character, however, through two creative peculiarities of the glossary, which seem to me to be particularly crucial for its functionality:

First, the use of terms is ‘explained’ in an exemplary manner through terms and as a matter of fact through entire sentences from Heidegger’s work. In other words, the lists of the terms is to be sure compiled by the editor Hildegard Feick, but its use is illustrated as it were by Heidegger himself. This ‘co-authorship’ becomes explicit in Feick’s dedication that ‘accompanies’ the Index after the 2nd edition (Feick 1961/1968: V, capitalization in the original, emphasis added):

DEDICATED
TO WHOM IT BELONGS,
MARTIN HEIDEGGER,
IN HONOR AND GRATITUDE
[DEM ES GEHÖRT,
MARTIN HEIDEGGER,
IN VEREHRUNG UND DANKBARKEIT
GEWIDMET]

Whereas the Index’s dependence upon Sein und Zeit is rooted in the self-referentiality of the explanations of the glossary, the glossary, through its selectivity, in turn exerts a hermeneutic influence on the interpretation of Sein und Zeit that should not be underestimated. For through the specific selection of terms, the latter become “guiding words” (Leitworte) (Heidegger 1980: V) and Heidegger’s exemplary sentences, which in this text are only meant to have an explanatory function, are rendered as “guiding sentences” (Leitsätze) (ibid.). Their inclusion in the glossary alone marks the particular relevance of certain terms for Heidegger’s thought and determines in which sentences or in what passages in the main text the core statements can be found and which paragraphs are to be taken into closer consideration.
The second characteristic of the Index is a particular strategy of spatializing concepts. The majority of entries refer to other entries in the index, thus. Which concepts are of particular philosophical importance is already suggested to the reader while looking up terms. Furthermore, the grouping of expressions that are otherwise distributed among 400 pages of the main text places certain concepts in relation to one another and already visually invokes specific philosophical connections. This space of conceptual ‘condensation’ of Heidegger’s philosophy becomes denser with every revised and expanded edition. Which meaning this spatialization of the Index has for the reading of Sein und Zeit, even from the editorial side, can be gaged by the fact that the preface to the fourth edition itself makes reference to how certain key words were “re-grouped” in Susanne Ziegler’s revision (Ziegler 1991: XIII).

Heidegger seems to have already feared the hermeneutic effects of the Index. As of the third edition (1980), it was introduced by an obituary of sorts for Feick by Heidegger, under the title Frau Dr. Hildegard Feick, der langjährigen getreuen Mitarbeiterin zum Gedächtnis. In this introduction he expresses his initial hesitations toward the Index project proposed by Feick and refers to the unavoidable restrictions as well as the danger of such an index:

The limitation manifests itself in the fact that such a detailed index necessarily dismembers the entirety of a work and denies access to its internal movement [...]
Precisely this “danger” anticipated by Heidegger is then aided and abetted in the fourth edition, when the Index is rendered “henceforth appropriate for citing” through careful revision, as Susanne Ziegler assures the reader in the preface (1991: XIII). It is no longer necessary to search the over 400 pages for a particularly informative quotation for certain conceptual links; the Index already presents the key passages ‘ready for use’. In the end, however, Heidegger had authorized the Index by thanking Feick for providing readers with “her so inconspicuous as well as reliable help while studying my writings” (HEIDEGGER 1980: VI). Pragmatism might have won out over the concerns of the philosopher. In any event, he even explicitly welcomes the fact, in the third edition of the Index, that there are now also references to all of his published texts after Sein und Zeit. For these references give the reader “the possibility of an insight into the paths and transformations [of his] thought” (HEIDEGGER 1980: VI).

No scholar who works with Sein und Zeit would in fact want to do without this helpful Index. Yet he or she would hardly notice how much more hermeneutic guidance the Index ‘imposes’ upon him or her owing to its specific ‘form’, in addition to its terminological explication and practical concordance of the pages.

Hermeneutic steering on the terminological site of philosophy

The translational norm of not translating glossaries but, as the case may be, creating them on the basis of translated main texts in principle affords the translator the opportunity or the necessity of rendering terms into “guiding words” through his or her new selection, of re-situating core philosophical statements within a work, or of emphasizing new referential connections among concepts. In this way, the translators of Sein und Zeit use these possibilities for hermeneutic ‘steering’ in different languages to different degrees and more or less intentionally.7 Sein und Zeit has meanwhile been translated into at least twenty-five languages and been re-translated many times – in Japan alone, there are at least eight translations in circulation. A comprehensive comparison of translations and indexes would exceed the framework of this essay. If I introduce a couple of these glossaries here, it is simply to provide a foil for the particular treatment of the glossary in the new Italian translation of Sein und Zeit.

For his Spanish translation, the translator José Gaos explicitly oriented his arrangement of the Índice de Traducciones, which was published separately from El ser y el

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7 Whether, and if so to whom, paratextual room to manoeuvre is made available in translations (to the translator, the publisher, the editor, or other ‘mediators’) depends of course on the publishing house and not the least on its financial resources – these editorial factors have to be bracketed in this study, however, because the discussion would otherwise go in an entirely different direction. For the interrelation of paratexts and editorial and publishing practices see JANSEN & WEGENER 2013.
tiempo in his handbook *Introducción a El Ser y el Tiempo de Martin Heidegger* (1993: 119-50), on the German *Index* (Gaos 1951/2002: 7). The orientation does not apply to the selection of entries. Rather, he adopts Feick’s principle of ‘spatializing’ concepts in that he groups certain terms according to word families with the curly bracket } and in this way suggests a close conceptual *connection* between those terms for the reader. Through references to certain places where the listed “guiding words” (Leitwörter) in *El ser ye el tiempo* are to be found, he simultaneously defines *nolens volens* particular passages as especially relevant.

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<th>Figure 2: Gaos 1993, 132-133</th>
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The English translators John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson provide two word lists to their translation (HEIDEGGER 1962): a *Glossary of German Expressions* sorted according to the German terms (MACQUARRIE & ROBINSON 1962a: 505-523) with the English “equivalent” or “equivalents” (ibid.: 503, the translators themselves place this problematic designation in quotation marks) and an *Index of English Expressions* sorted according to the translated terms (MACQUARRIE & ROBINSON 1962b: 524-583) (altogether 80 pages), where they point to the “chief passages in which they appear” (MACQUARRIE & ROBINSON 1962c: 503). In other words, through their selection, they necessarily emphasize the philosophical relevance of specific terms and passages. Yet they redirect the reader very spuriously to other entries. They thus make very little use of the opportunity to refer to the connections between certain concepts.
Thirty-four years later, Joan Stambough presents a new English translation of Sein und Zeit. Here we find at the end a Lexicon that was compiled by Theodore Kisiel (1996: 419-80). Kisiel explains in his introduction to it (ibid.: 419) that his work has been based on the Index by Feick, the very extensive Handbuch zum Textstudium von Martin Heideggers ‘Sein und Zeit’ by Raine A. Bast and the glossary by Macquarrie and Robinson. The orientation to Feick does not refer to the specific ‘form’ according to which the German Index is designed. It corresponds rather in ‘form’ to the Index of English Expressions by Macquarrie and Robinson. Yet Kisiel takes far more advantage of the possibility to refer to other terms and thus suggest conceptual links. The French translator François Vezin does entirely without an item resembling a glossary. Instead, we find at the end an eight-page explanation with the title “Le mot Dasein” for why he did not translate this term (1986: 519-27). This exclusivity attributes to it an absolutely central function for understanding Heidegger’s work.

The glossary of the Chinese translators Chen and Wang looks with its two word-lists – six pages sorted according to the German terms (2006a: 505-11) and four pages according to the translated ones (2006b: 512-15) – extremely minimalistic in term of interpretative steering. There, reference to specific passages is avoided. However, the marking of certain expressions as “guiding words” remains unavoidable.
In contrast, the author of the most recent Italian translation of Sein und Zeit, Alfredo Marini, takes advantage of all the opportunities for hermeneutic influence afforded by the selective character of the glossary that we find in the appendix of his translation under the title Lessico di “Essere e tempo” (MARINI 2006b: 1403-98; henceforth: Lessico). Through rhetorical skill, moreover, he successively creates new realms of philosophical thought in which certain conceptual connections in Heidegger’s work undergo an increase in reflexivity. Ironically, Marini furnishes these ‘open spaces’ precisely by – according to his own admissions – orienting himself towards the original, that is, towards Feick’s Index (MARINI 2006b: 1405). Yet what precisely does this asserted orientation toward the original consist of in fact? A closer look reveals that Marini actually translated the particular ‘form’ of the Index referred to above, but far more radically than Gaos did, in that he claims “to use only sentences by Heidegger himself” (MARINI 2006b: 1405) to explain the listed “guiding words”:

"Dell’Index Feick abbiamo adottato il principio di usare soltanto frasi di Heidegger" (ibid., emphasis added). What pushes this guarantee of the originality of the explications in his glossary into the background, however, is the not insignificant fact that we are actually dealing not with Heidegger’s sentences from Sein und Zeit but with the sentences from Essere e Tempo translated by Marini. In the same breath, Marini does not fail to point out that Heidegger himself authorized the very Index which he had chosen as point of reference for creating his own Lessico (ibid.). A very refined way to earn, as it were, Heidegger’s (indirect) certification of his own translational decisions. By translating the principle of self-referentiality of the Index Marini translates its highly resil-
ient foundation of *legitimation*, thus encouraging the reader to abandon himself to the following concise 100-page glossary that refers (in contrast to the later editions of the *Index* exclusively to *Essere e tempo* (Marini 2006b: 1405).9

We can indeed easily recognize the ‘form’ designed by Feick as well as the two decisive characteristics we already discussed above: here, too, expressions are rendered as “guiding words” and explained by “guiding sentences”, i.e. by the “most expressive or dominant citation”, as Marini formulates it appropriately (2006b: 1405, transl.: L.H.), with reference to key paragraphs or passages in the main text. It should not come as a surprise that the selection deviates from the original, suggesting thus other conceptual relevancies. This occurs already in a short introductory ‘chapter’ to the *Lessico* with the metaphorically revealing title “*Chiavi d’accesso Tedesco/italiano*” (Access key German/Italian) (Marini 2006b: 1407-1410). Here the reader is referred, starting from the German term with a → pointing the way, not primarily to its Italian translation but to the Italian key word under which the term will be allocated conceptually. We already find here German terms that do not have an entry of their own in Feick’s *Index* and thus do not have a distinct profile as “guiding words”.

![Figure 5: Marini 2006b: 1408-9.](image)

Of even greater philosophical importance is how Marini expands the principle of *spatialization*, already displayed in Feick’s *Index*, by which conceptual connections are suggested to the reader. For precisely in this principle of visually ‘imposing’ reflection on certain connections upon the reader lies the actual hermeneutic power of suggestion that Feick and presumably Heidegger as well were not entirely aware of, and that Marini makes philosophically productive (see in the illustrations already the typographically much more conspicuous references to other entries in comparison to the *Index*). Marini acquires the space to further increase this principle through an addi-

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9 The Italian translator Pietro Chiodi does without a glossary altogether in the first edition from 1953. At this time, however, Feick’s *Index* had not yet been published either. To the last version revised by himself from 1969, he then appended a nine-page glossary. In contrast, the Chiodi translation re-issued by Volpi in 2005 has 33 pages. Here, conceptual links are suggested and key passages in *Sein und Zeit* are emphasized by the selection of “guiding words”, by the reference to other terms. In this context, it is particularly interesting that, along with Chiodi, Volpi also helped to shape Italian Heidegger terminology. Crucial to this was above all Volpi’s *Glossary* to his own translation of *Wegmarken* in 1987, which in the nineteen-nineties became the point of reference for a “school of translation” (Curcio 2005: 318), for which, in Curcio’s estimation, “the clarity, beauty and melody of the Italian [were] of top priority” (Curcio 2005: 319).
tional rhetorical sleight of hand. He expands some entries in need of explanations and marked with a • by redirecting the reader to another part of the appendix, where the entry is promised to be completed by an “ulteriore approfondimento” (MARINI 2006b: 1406). The obedient reader following the sign finds him or herself in a strikingly detailed, nearly 160-page ‘translation report’ bearing the title Postfazione Tradurre Sein und Zeit (1251-402). Here Marini virtually delves into Heidegger’s terminology to explain his own terminological creations, comparing these, by the way, also with translations in other languages, but above all with the solutions offered by his Italian predecessor Pietro Chiodi. This distancing from Chiodi, which does not first occur in the afterword but already in the Lessico, has been criticized as “obsessive” (see for example BIUSO 2006). Yet this distancing not only functions as a criticism of other translations in order to legitimate his own. Through downright hair-splitting terminological considerations, Marini makes instead a space for philosophical creativity. Here, in the form of extraordinarily meticulous analyses of micro-structural translation units, new connections are made which in turn win their power of suggestion through the principle of evidence in the literal sense using capitals for emphasizing. Exemplary is Marini’s discussion (encompassing fifteen pages) of his translation of the German root “HOL” occurring in the terms “HOLen”, “wiederHOLen”, “WiederHOLung”, “zurückHOLen”, “einHOLen”, “überHOLen”, “UnüberHOLbarkeit”, “erHOLen” (sic),10 “aufHOLen” (2006a: 1326-37, 1378-80, capitals: Marini). Nota bene: only the term “Wiederholung” is profiled as a “guiding term” in the Index of Feick. By translating systematically the root HOL from Old High German: halēn (to hail, to call, to summon) with the Latin root PET from PETere (to require, to seek, to strive for, to seek to reach) he virtually situates them within a conceptual framework. Only through this translatological emphasis does Marini make us aware, in the first place, of the root HOL as a systematic element of Heidegger’s terminology and conceptuality. By making the verb HOLen apparent in the different German expressions Marini highlights the agentive and intentional character of all the HOL-terms.11 By extracting this root from its terminological embeddedness he simultaneously emphasizes the temporal and spatial modifications of HOL by the prefixes “wieder/zurück” (re-), “ein” (in), and “über” (sur/over) which place these HOL-concepts (wiederHOLen/zurückHOLen, einHOLen, überHOLen) in a specific relationship to one another (MARINI 2006a: 1331, 1379):

10 This must be a typo. I assume that Marini means the expression herHOLen.

11 Gaos places in his index the German HOL family together with the entry for “Holen” as well (1993: 127-28). Yet he does not pursue this connection in the translatological, systematizing way that Marini more consistently does. In light of his meticulousness, it is astonishing that Marini did not list nachHOLen and zusammenHOLen as well. Especially since he translated them according to the PET principle in his translation of Sein und Zeit.
This translatological, morphosyntactic decomposition culminates in a correction of Chiodi’s translation of the Heideggerian expression “Unüberholbarkeit” or “unüberholbare Möglichkeit”. Chiodi had for his part suggested “insuperabilità” or “possibilità insuperabile”. By way of the focus on the root HOL, Marini demonstrates that Chiodi left untranslated precisely that element of the expression which is in his eyes the pivotal point of the Heideggerian concept and links the term conceptually to “wiederHOLen” and “einHOLen”.

His “dimostrazione” (MARINI 2006a: 1337) makes the disintegration of the integrity of the conceptual, temporally and spatially structured triad (wiederHOLen, einHOLen, überHOLen and their related zurückHOLen, herHOLen, aufHOLen) immediately evident (MARINI 2006a: 1328):

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12 Here, at the latest, it become apparent just how much philosophical weight Marini imputes to the root HOL in this conceptual context: he abandons the “economy” of the German term “einholen” in order to reconstruct translatologically the agentive and intentional character of the verb “HOLEn” on the one hand, and the temporal and spatial modification of the prefix “ein” on the other.

13 Literally: unsurpassability [transl. C.P.].

14 Literally: unsurpassable possibility [transl. C.P.].

15 Marini himself places “dimostrazione” in quotation marks. He thus seems completely aware of the “demonstrative” character of his argumentation.
Instead, Marini offers a construction that, as it were, gathers every conceptually significant element of the term with “no spillage of meaning”, as we should perhaps, contrary to Montgomery (see above), indeed describe this type of translation:

*unüberHOLbar* (Heidegger)

“comPETe in modo assolutamente *insuperabile*” (MARINI 2006a: 1335, emphasis: L.H.)

labeledly: to compete in an unsurpassable way


cf. the English translations:
“not to be outstripped” (MACQUARRIE & ROBINSON)

“not-to-be-bypassed” (Stambough)

“die *unüberHOLbare Möglichkeit*”

(HEIDEGGER 2006:746)

“la possibilità […] che *insuperabilmente compETe*”

(HEIDEGGER 2006: 747, [transl.: A.M.])

labeledly: The potentiality that competes unsurpassably


cf. the English translations:
“the possibility which is not to be out-
stripped”

(HEIDEGGER 1962: 309 [transl.: Mac-
quarrie & Robinson])

“the possibility not-to-be-bypassed”

(HEIDEGGER 1996: 244 [transl.: Stam-
bough)

With such work of decomposition, Marini demonstrates to us, again and again, his provocative thesis that *Sein und Zeit* invites a translation into Italian. In this way, he unceremoniously turns the internationally transmitted lament of untranslatability of

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16 This is not the place for an exhaustive explanation of the possibility as the existential and the “ontological determination of Dasein” (HEIDEGGER 1927/1986: 143f., 182f.). We are concerned here primarily with a particular technique of translation that can be understood precisely because of its visual character without knowing the closer philosophical connection in Heidegger. For a detailed philosophical discussion related to the translation of this connection, see Marini himself (2006a: 1326ff., 1378ff.).
Heidegger’s jargon into the sovereign claim that Heidegger lends himself so well to translation into the Italian that one could almost say that he actually already wrote for Italians: “Sein und Zeit è già un testo per gli italiani” (2006a: 1265).\(^\text{17}\)

In spite of this translation optimism and his ‘demonstrations’ of translatability, Alberto G. Biuso (2006) criticizes Marini in a review for having translated like an engineer. He condemns the new translation solutions as “technical” and “artificial”. This fundamental irritation cannot be explained by reference to individual translation solutions. They are caused rather by Marini’s fundamental method of translation that was just exemplified and in fact proves to be a veritable archaeological technique of translation (see also Heller 2017a). Marini borrows this technique, as he already announced to his public four years prior to the publication of his Sein und Zeit translation, from Heidegger’s own philosophical praxis, which he describes as a “work at the bedrock of German-European terminology” (Marini 2002: 67). Marini’s point of reference for his translation is in fact not primarily the intension of the concepts but rather Heidegger’s specific architecture of terminology. He explores Heidegger’s terminological ‘construction works’ and re-enacts his construction plans in his elaborated Lessico and in the terminological reflections in his ‘translation report’. In this architectonic work, many of the load-bearing walls of the philosophical edifice of Sein und Zeit become (again) visible for even the German reader in the first place. The vigor of this translatological revelation is first enabled however by the materiality of writing, that allows for signs and thus for concepts, ideas and thoughts, to be (newly) spatialized by being transferred to a visually perceptible relation (KOGGE 2005). In this sense, Marini exploits the objectifying character of script and uses it as an epistemic instrument. He dismantles the Heideggerian linguistic material into its morphological component parts, lines it up, displaces it, re-assembles it in a morphosyntactically different, but conceptually analogical way. It is indeed this work on the linguistic “building material” of Sein und Zeit that had earned him the reputation of a translation “engineer” (BIUSO 2006).

Yet it is precisely through this strategy of decomposition, facilitated by the peculiarity of the alphabetic script, that he forces us to look anew, to blend out familiar conceptual or logical connections and consider alternative possibilities of thought. It is in this concrete sense that Marini opens up new spaces in which new opportunities for reflection can be found that do not arise on their own from the reading of the philosophical work. For such conceptual connections as we exposed above are not explicated by Heidegger; they are first revealed or constructed anew by the Italian philosophical translator Marini to the analytic gaze.

Paradoxically, Marini exerts an almost intrusive hermeneutic influence, not by so-called “free” translation, which has always been tainted by the suspicion of manipulation and is so feared in the academic field. Marini instead creates the space in which to provide the reader with his very own offer of reflection through pedantic ‘fidelity’ and meticulous translation of terminology or even terminological fragments. The conspicuous philosophical idiosyncrasy, which paves its way through translatological

\(^{17}\) For a more thorough discussion of Marini’s argument of the translatability of Heidegger see Heller (2013: 251ff.; 2015).
fidelity to words and morphemes, might just be the reason for why in university teaching, as well as in the Italian Heidegger discourse, the Chiodi translation is still mainly used. This reveals the prevalent expectation vis-à-vis translators in this discourse that they should be as inconspicuous as possible, both linguistically and philosophically.\textsuperscript{18}

**Conclusion**

The starting point of this excursus on the ‘nano-level’ of philosophical translations was the observation that, contrary to the general translatological trend of focusing on increasingly large translation units, the focus narrows time and again, at least in the discussion about academic translation, to micro-structural translation units on the level of terminology. At the same time, translators are often regarded as “potent actors in the globalization of knowledge” (MONTGOMERY 2010: 303) insofar as it is insisted that translation is “not merely a linguistic process, but a form of personal engagement” (MONTGOMERY 2010: 304). Expressed in this insistence is a doubt about the relevance of micro-structural translation units for the creation of academic thought. Therefore, the contribution of translators in knowledge production is sometimes sweepingly subsumed under a type of ‘transfer’ or ‘transformation’ of stores of knowledge, methods, or theories, without being able to explain, however, how these processes really come about or what the decisive translation units really are that stimulate the transformation of habits of thought, or the transfer of a style of thought (see for example Link 2017). The vague reference to translation as means of knowledge transfer gives little thought to which entities of an academic culture are (or can be) considered translatable. In this way, it remains unclear as to what relationship translation processes on the micro-level of academic texts actually have with the larger movements of transformation within knowledge cultures.\textsuperscript{19} Which larger movements will arise from Marini’s unconventional translation of *Sein und Zeit* can only be evaluated from a historical distance we have not reached yet.

It is neither necessary nor expedient to liberate translation from its linguistic dimension. For the concern that translation might get reduced to the meaningless replacement of a string of signs if we focus more closely on its linguistic dimension proves – as I tried to show – to be fully unfounded. Stressing that translation is “not merely a

\textsuperscript{18} This ideal of the inconspicuous translator is not specific to philosophy. Even scholars in translation studies adhere to it. To be sure, the path-breaking study by VENUTI (1995) on the invisibility of translators in the literary scene and his call for more visibility received great support in the scientific community and triggered numerous studies in the literary field. Yet in the field of science communication, or of communication within the discipline, the ideal of translational invisibility is still promulgated by some in translation studies. A paradigmatic example for the persistence of this ideal is the publishing policy of journals: articles are returned for style editing when it is detectable that they had been translated. For the philosophical productivity of such irritations in the habits of reading and reflection caused by translation, see Schleiermacher’s address to the Academy *Ueber die verschiedenen Methoden des Uebersetzens* from 1813 (1963).

\textsuperscript{19} For this discussion see HELLER 2017b.
linguistic process” has ossified into a commonplace rhetorical figure that is invoked to prove translatorialological ‘progressiveness’ on the one hand and to profess to acknowledge the complexity of translation on the other hand. Translation studies should not feel flattered by such supposed gesture of approval. Rather, it should let itself be unsteadied by this gesture and uphold the extensive cultural, social and academic relevance of its primarily linguistically constituted object, the translation. For language is in fact the material that translators work on and bring into play when engaging in the creation of knowledge.

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