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## Philosophical Tradition in Translation Poetics of Tradition and Heuristics of its Dis/Continuation on the Basis of Paratextual Evidence

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*Keywords: tradition of thought, history of philosophy, poetics, paratext, philosopher-translator, Heidegger, Bibikhin, translator's afterword*

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## Philosophical Tradition in Translation

### Poetics of Tradition and Heuristics of its Dis/Continuation on the Basis of Paratextual Evidence

#### Abstract

*While reflecting upon the intrinsically multilingual and translational history of philosophy, philosophers and philosophy scholars frequently argue metaphorically in terms of a tradition. The perspectives vary in emphasizing either the tradition's continuance or its transition, whereas translation is perceived of as the central or an auxiliary force in both processes. Four approaches where a philosophical tradition is differently poeticized are discussed in the paper. They reveal specific operations of transfer and transformation which are claimed to be supported or accelerated by/in translation. Such tradition-related operations appear to qualify for being traced and pinned down in a given philosophical translation. The paper seeks to work out this heuristic potential within the selected poetics of tradition and draws upon the paratextual comments on the first Russian translation of Heidegger's "Being and Time" to eventually illustrate the translation-induced shifts of whatever might be called a philosophical tradition.*

#### Introduction

Philosophical reflection advances by integrating and taking into account previous philosophical thoughts. It has historically done so by crossing language barriers and being intrinsically cosmopolitan: "*Philosophy* was originally an ancient Greek word, passed down to us through Latinized and Arabized forms, and it can be treated as the name of a tradition which has followed the same path [...]" (RÉE 2001: 230)<sup>1</sup>. Philosophy is thus claimed to be significantly shaped by dialogicity as well as linguistic discord and diversity (cf. RÉE 2001: 227–28; 1996), where the latter is called "philosophical multilingualism" (RÉE 2001: 237) and is supposed to capture the fact that the European philosophy, its language and vocabulary are creations of translation. These circumstances make philosophy to a process in which qualities of tradition and continuation are equally inherent as phenomena of translation and transformation. As Anthony Pym puts it, "[t]ranslation becomes a condition of philosophy's own iterability, placing its legacy in foreign hands [...], as carrying on a lost tradition" (PYM 2007: 40–41).

A number of philosophers and philosophy scholars from different countries and different fields of expertise have made conclusive observations at the nexus of tradition and/in translation in the context of philosophy's history. As a matter of fact, they approached both terms and the relation between them differently. Respective essays by four philosophers and philosophy

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<sup>1</sup> All current and following emphases in in-text quotations are original, unless otherwise stated.

scholars (Angelica Nuzzo, Andrej Smirnov, Alasdair MacIntyre, Andrew Benjamin) will be closely analyzed in the first chapter as to the way tradition and translation are framed and interrelated in each case. It will become evident during this contextual analysis that tradition is used as a metaphor or an umbrella term to indicate diverse processes and operations which oscillate between two forces or tendencies implied by the very word *tradition*, i.e. consistency and conservation on the one side, change and re-/transformation on the other. Although tradition's metaphoric framings will allow for terming the authors' approaches poetics, they will be admitted to simultaneously refer to tangible processes and operations which are assisted, disclosed or accelerated by translation. This will take on contours in the second chapter where interlingual, intertextual, intersemiotic, and interpretive processes and operations, since translation-aided, will be assumed to be trackable in paratexts. As such they will subsequently be elicited within a heuristic attempt in the paratext of the first Russian translation of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* by Vladimir Bibihin. This will eventually touch upon one peculiar case of the work of a philosopher-translator who moves from within a certain tradition and transforms the tradition of the original text (cf. LARGE 2014).

In this manner, the paper seeks to boil down the evasive term "tradition" to more solid text-analytical entities and, by following the idea that paratextual clues (e.g. glossaries) can reveal hermeneutic processes (cf. HELLER 2020: 243–247), to grasp these tradition-bearing entities in paratextual evidence of a given philosophical translation within a target-oriented descriptive approach (cf. TOURY 2012). By shedding light on the quite intricate interface of "tradition" in/and translation, it is my hope to contribute as a translation scholar to what has been envisioned as "translation theorists [performing] as mediators between philosophical discourse and translation practice" (PYM 2007: 44) where philosophy can benefit from "the many techniques by which translators themselves constantly reduce complexity" (ibid.).

### **Poetics of Tradition in Translation**

How is tradition referred to in the scholarly reflection upon philosophy and its history? And what function is granted to translation in these reflections? The discourse represented in the following essays reveals different patterns of interpretation of tradition and/in translation as well as their interplay in the context of philosophy's history. The reflections are undoubtedly anchored in broader philosophical and theoretical schools, systems, and worldviews of the authors. But in dealing particularly with tradition and/in translation, their nature is more poetological rather than theoretical. This is due to the fact that their respective application is often highly metaphoric, substitutive and representative of more complex and perhaps elusive contiguities. Confronted with the difficulty to define "tradition", we may thus follow Jacques Derrida's *sous rature* and apply the term "under erasure" since it is inaccurate yet (apparently) necessary (cf. DERRIDA / SPIVAK 1997: xiv-xv). For this reason, I prefer calling each framework *poetics*. As such, however, each framework has its pivot points and cornerstones and is therefore far from lacking theoretical underpinning.

In the following, four poetics by four different authors will be introduced and provided with a subsequent comment on their theoretical plausibility and explicability.

**Poetics of Dis/Continuation**

Angelica Nuzzo (2000) argues that no thinking is absolute, i.e. without context and without references, hence philosophical thinking cannot but be imbedded into “traditions of thought” (*Traditionen des Denkens*) (ibid.: 30) or a “historical continuum” (*geschichtliches Kontinuum*) (ibid.: 31).<sup>2</sup> Languages, texts, questions, and concepts are all regarded as bearing a tradition which in this manner acquires linguistic, etymologic or epistemological connotations. Translation’s role here is consequently to ensure tradition’s cultural, historical, linguistic, textual and conceptual continuity and renewal. Translation is supposed to mediate the process of a “historical sedimentation of different cultural elements” (ibid.: 37) and to move reference points beyond one’s linguistic and cultural horizon so that to rearrange them in a new one (ibid.: 33–34).

However, translation is even more than that: As a communicative relationship of otherness, it is claimed to constitute the initial principle of the intellectual history (*in principium fuit interpretis*, ibid.: 33) and is conceptualized as tradition’s *modus essendi*, i.e. the very modality which is capable of bringing tradition to the surface, uncovering and maintaining it, but also transmitting and transforming it (cf. ibid.: 30–37). Tradition’s change over time is backed up by translation, translation is an element of transformation, a *transmutazione*, and represent a “dialectics of continuity and discontinuity” (ibid.: 46). And as a temporal and transformative force it eventually contributes to the very historical communicability of a language, a culture or a tradition. The argument culminates thus in a highly metaphorical vision in which translation becomes the mainstay or the crux of traditions’ existence, revival and evolution, whereas (and this is the essay’s central thesis) the history of philosophy presents itself as a translation process.

Nuzzo suggests that the history of philosophy is equally its translation history. She applies the terms tradition and translation to denote transfer and transformation processes in the (translation) history of philosophy. Her elaborations on the deep correlation between tradition and translation seems to be greatly induced by both terms’ etymological proximity. Indeed, tradition stems from *trādere*, itself originating from *trans + dare*, and signifies the act of handing over and delivering, i.e. tradition is “that which is handed down as belief or practice” (THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY). As to translation, it refers back to *translātāre*, originally related to *transferre*, and means “to convey from place to place” (ibid.). The proximity is striking.

Furthermore, Nuzzo argues now and then in terms of a continuum and a dis/continuity. It should be acknowledged that tradition implies temporality, and, as a result, tradition, history, and continuation are mutually highly suggestive. As a matter of fact, there is a revealing proximity between *tradition* and *continuation*, too. This further Latin root, namely *continuāre*, means to continue, to carry on, to persist, to last (ibid.). Its derivative *continuus* stands for “uninterrupted” (ibid.) and together with its prefixed antonym indicates the tense interplay between continuity and discontinuity, conservative and progressive poles that generates transformative powers within a philosophical tradition (cf. NUZZO 2000: 46).

Dis/continuation is thus as much a metaphor in the reported context as tradition or translation in seeking to capture the complexity of philosophy’s history and development over space and time as well as across languages. What they all presumably attempt to express is that

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<sup>2</sup> All current and following translations are mine, unless otherwise stated.

tradition represents a “continuity of cognition” (*Kontinuität der Erkenntnis*) (DEMANDT 1978: 203) which nevertheless is subject to renewals and transformations. If this continuity resembles a relay race or a torch run (*ibid.*), then a philosophical text or a concept would be passed on in translation as a baton undergoing natural changes during each transition. A crucial point is, however, that according to the principle of *in principium fuit interpretas* a starting point of such an epistemic torch run was itself a transition or a translation.

In this point, Nuzzo’s standpoint is highly evocative of Jacques Derrida’s elaborations on textuality, dissemination and iterability, although her essay lacks any references to him. Positing that the history of philosophy represents a translation process with translation as its initial principle seems to be another way of saying in a deconstructivist spirit that the metaphysical notion of an origin should be replaced by the immanence of traces and thus translation itself can be conceived of as iterability (cf. DIZDAR 2006: 183–184). Note furthermore that Derrida’s gesture of interpreting the origin myth of the tower of Babel as a narrative of deconstruction, dissemination and translation (cf. DERRIDA / GRAHAM 1985) puts the latter in a similar position of epistemic centrality.

With Derrida in mind, I propose the metaphor of a fabric (cf. *text-ure*) with different (semantic, cultural, epistemic etc.) strands (or traces) that obtain in translation new shades, pattern or threads and can get one of the components cut off or ‘interrupted.’ Since it will be the very aspect of continuation and discontinuation within the fabric of a tradition that underlines its transmutations, I call Nuzzo’s framework poetics of dis/continuation.

### ***Poetics of Systemic Coherency***

Russian philosopher Andrej Smirnov, himself a translator of the Islamic philosophy into Russian, applies the term “tradition of thought” (*мыслительная традиция*) (SMIRNOV 2012b: 205) to describe philosophical cultures in terms of their mutual hermeneutic otherness (*герменевтическая чужеродность*), incomprehensible without special translation procedures (*трансляционная процедура*). The central question he pursues is the problem of the definition of “world philosophy” (*всемирная философия*) and of the reciprocal comprehension between “philosophical continents” (*материки философии*) represented by Europe, Islam, India, China, and Russia<sup>3</sup>. A “philosophical tradition” (*философская традиция*) is carried by epistemological subjects whose thinking it imprints with certain “philosophical colors” (*окрашено в философские цвета*) *ibid.*: 204). It can be described as a “unity of problematics” (*проблемное единство*) (*ibid.*: 207) focused on a “monolithic problem area” (*единое проблемное поле*) (*ibid.*: 208). And it is manifested in culture-specific “principles of meaning creation” (*принципы смыслоформирования*) (*ibid.*: 210). It may be assumed that epistemic interests are what is implied by problematics and that they are seen as culturally embedded. Translation’s task in this view is the bridging of the hermeneutic, but also the cultural alterity of foreign philosophical traditions.

It is interesting to note that this notion of translation is in a peculiar contrast to the author’s same-year contribution on the translation of philosophy, where both philosophy and its translation are characterized in quite traditional, linguistic terms: Philosophy is depicted as

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<sup>3</sup> “[...] что она [всемирная философия] есть? Конгломерат тех философских массивов, которые представлены огромными «материками» философии: Европой, арабским (мусульманским) миром, Индией, Китаем, Россией?” (SMIRNOV 2012b: 203).

a highly cohesive and consistent system, macro-text or thesaurus of philosophical terminology which exhibits “high-level systematicity and cohesiveness” (SMIRNOV 2012a: 58). The translation of philosophy is therefore called for to dissolve or unwrap this cohesiveness, i.e. its challenge is the “de-cohesion” or, literally, “the untying of the tiedness” (*развязывание связности*) (ibid.: 55). Smirnov’s more pragmatic notion of translation seeks to decrypt the tangled philosophical system rather textually, lexically and terminologically.

The aspect of continuation which was formative for Nuzzo’s poetics is not uncharacteristic for Smirnov’s poetics either. The crucial difference is that it builds upon one specific meaning of the word which shimmers through the phrase “philosophical continents”. For *continent* as well originates from *continuāre* or, more precisely, from its further derivative *continēre*, meaning to hang together (THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY). A key facet of Smirnov’s considerations in his second essay, i.e. his thinking about philosophy and philosophical tradition in term of a system and coherency, naturally fits to this perspective. Handing over and delivering (*trādere*) a philosophical text entails accordingly not only conveying (*transferre*) it and carrying it, with or without interruptions, on (*continuāre*) but also ensuring its coherent integrity (*continēre*).

Smirnov’s notions of homogenous problematics that constitutes a philosophical tradition goes in line with the notion of coherency, too, and, it must be noted, is not unaffected by his expertise in Islamic philosophy inasmuch as it is posited in a direct reference to it (cf. SMIRNOV 2012b: 207-208). Needless to say, a problematic or epistemic unity is suggested by the very way philosophy and its history are usually depicted, namely in smaller or larger coherent units (cf. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA), e.g. as major systems (e.g. Western and Eastern philosophies) and subsystems within (e.g. Scholasticism, Deconstruction, Confucianism); movements, whether person-inspired (e.g. Aristotelianism, Kantianism) or religion-based (Islamic or Jewish philosophy); and areas or branches (e.g. aesthetics, logic, philosophy of language). Sometimes, popular overview literature (cf. e.g. WEEKS 2014), certain thinkers (cf. HEIDEGGER / ROJEWICZ / SCHUWER 1994; KANT / YOUNG 1992: 538) and philosophical discourses (cf. EWING 2013) portray philosophy and its history also in terms of fundamental questions or problems. Hence, speaking in terms of Islamic, deconstructivist, post-Kantian or the-question-of-what-is-mind tradition will probably meet Smirnov’s point.

It must further be noted that Smirnov’s vision of philosophy and its texts as a complicated conceptual or terminological system and of translation as its disentanglement mechanism is not unparalleled in the discourse on translation of philosophy. Quite in this vein, for example, a “systemic comprehension” (*systematisches Verständnis*) SCHNEIDER 1999: 142) of philosophy is recommended within which i.a. central concepts’ “external correlations” (*externe Zusammenhänge*) and “internal distinctions” (*interne Differenzierungen*) (ibid.: 145), along with the correlations among previous translations and those with other target-language texts (cf. ibid.: 147), should be consistently respected. Otherwise, the translation of philosophy threatens to result in undesirable intellectual shifts as it was criticized, for example, in the case of Spinoza’s translations or translators (cf. ibid.: 135-137, 146). Translation scholars also underline the “conceptual density of philosophical discourse” (VENUTI 1998: 108) and the necessity of exploring the terms’ discursive values (*valeur*) out of their mutual intricate cross-references (cf. ALBERT 2001: 211).

I regard Smirnov's reflections as poetics of systemic coherence because of the fact that he strongly builds upon similar notions of cohesiveness and system, whether it be terminological (as that of a philosophical text) or epistemic (as that of a philosophical school).

### ***Poetics of Multisemiotic Entrenchment***

While pursuing the question of a tradition, Alasdair MacIntyre touches upon the history and the translation of philosophy within the general, verbal and nonverbal social practice (cf. MACINTYRE 1988: 371–388). He demonstrates in particular that tradition entails an ethical dimension of values and beliefs attached to its linguistic appearance: Tradition is embodied in linguistic and behavioral forms which are in their turn informed by communities' value and belief systems (cf. *ibid.*: 371–374). People and institutions are bearing and engendering the tradition, yet they are initiated into the tradition via language learning in the first place (cf. *ibid.*: 382). According to MacIntyre, the fact that language and speech are tradition-informed can be observed in the system of naming and classificatory schemes, in the lexical polysemy, and in a referential set of authoritative texts (cf. *ibid.*: 382–383). Tradition is thus manifest linguistically and intertextually on the surface, performed and exercised on the social stage and rooted deeply in ethics or ideology.

Which function is ascribed to translation in this context? Translation is highlighted as means of linguistic and conceptual transformation and innovation. MacIntyre's main concern is about the rootless modernity and its emancipation "from social, cultural, and linguistic particularity and so from tradition" (*ibid.*: 388). Accordingly, translations of/from historically anchored, tradition-informed languages-in-use into languages of our traditionless modernity are claimed to be potentially neutralized, distorted and decontextualized (cf. *ibid.*: 384–286). Despite of the seemingly linguistic emphasis, the issue of translation raised in this light encompasses the cultural and the social as well as ethics and ideology, hereby suggesting an understanding of translation as not only linguistic, but also cultural and social transfer.

In his later work MacIntyre speaks of "a tradition of practice or practices" (MACINTYRE 2007: 222) which again is virtue- or value-oriented and embodies the pursuit of certain goods. Such tradition lives or is exercised as long as its narrative is unaccomplished (cf. *ibid.*: 223). Thus, tradition can also be conceived of as a (value) narrative. Reminiscent of Nuzzo's and Smirnov's traditions of thought is furthermore the observation that "all reasoning takes place within the context of some traditional mode of thought transcending through criticism and invention the limitations of what had hitherto been reasoned in that tradition; this is as true of modern physics as of medieval logic" (*ibid.*: 222).

What has been envisaged as philosophical tradition's cultural conditioning in Smirnov's poetics, is expanded in MacIntyre's approach to cover the entire sociocultural, sociolinguistic and socioethical practice behind philosophy's history. It has been acknowledged that an interlingual transfer is at the same time a cultural or intercultural one (cf. REIB & VERMEER 1991; BACHMANN-MEDICK 2014). This is to say that what is latent and is being covertly transported alongside linguistic signs are historically grown social, political, ideological and ethical symbols and values. Of such nature is e.g. the translation of the human rights framework that bears the entire complexity of its cultural and historical conditioning, the whole body of thought sustaining its philosophical footing in legal ethics and the enterprise of its individual visionaries and pioneers (cf. BACHMANN-MEDICK 2012). Typical in this context, as

MacIntyre himself suggests, are the backlinks to multisemiotic tradition-bearers, i.e. sociocultural realities and expectations, words and namings with their conceptual, semantic, and etymological histories, normative/authoritative texts, and influential persons. For this reason, I refer to this approach as to the poetics of multisemiotic entrenchment that, importantly enough, applies to philosophical translations, too:

*Philosophical translation between different European languages [...] is hemmed in not only by a generally acknowledged tradition of paradigmatic philosophical texts, but also by a deep sediment of past linguistic interactions, which authors will have expected their readers to recognize.* (RÉE 2001: 245–246).

### **Poetics of Interpretive Bifurcation**

Last but not least, by analyzing Hegel's and Heidegger's different readings of the texts constituting the history of philosophy (e.g. Plato), Andrew Benjamin accentuates the interpretive conflicts as the very essence of a tradition. The immanently plural and conflictual interpretive inscriptions (*implacements*) defines and constitutes philosophical tradition:

*Conflicts of interpretation have both a diachronic and synchronic nature. Existing through historical time they form part of the tradition. Existing at a particular point in historical time they enact the plurality of tradition. Tradition in this sense is both plural and conflictual. Its unfolding is the unfolding of the conflicts that constitute it. [...] A text cannot be interpreted outside of tradition, indeed the act of interpretation is the continuance of tradition. [...] [A] philosophical approach to the relationship between philosophy and history should start with an acknowledgement of the centrality of tradition. Tradition becomes therefore the generalized site of interpretive differential plurality.* (BENJAMIN 2014: 163–164).

Benjamin's self-critical plea is for acknowledging both the interpretative subject (the interpreter) and its interpretative act as parts of the object of interpretation (cf. *ibid.*: 167). Tradition arises thus out of multiple subject-bound acts of interpretation and is the cumulative legacy of intrinsically conflictual interpretations enwrapped in philosophical texts and discourses. Translation can be said to function here as an interpretive act (cf. *ibid.*: 172–174). Quite similar to Nuzzo's tradition-revealing and -engendering translation, translation in this case is also conflict-revealing and conflict-engendering, it is the very medium or act where semantic and interpretive difference manifests itself.

Highlighting of interpretive conflicts and of translation as their channel, trigger or catalyst reminds strongly of translation's role of bridging hermeneutic otherness in Smirnov's approach. Nuzzo's logic of dis/continuation and transmutation obtains in the light of interpretive conflicts in its turn a causal mechanism. Discontinuation will thus occur whenever an interpretive conflict establishes an interpretive difference.

Benjamin's considerations seem in any case to invite to two perspectives: first, a synchronic, zoomed-in perspective on interpretive conflicts in translation taking place here and now, and second, a diachronic, zoomed-out perspective on philosophy's (translation) history as a polarized, uneven, bumpy journey. To prove the latter true, it will suffice, for instance, to take a look at how the Aristotelian discourse was individualized in the romanticism



translations (cf. VENUTI 1998: 69), or how the “tradition” of the mind–body problem was revolutionized by Descartes (cf. NANNINI 2000: 147–148). Convincing evidence for the relevance of both the synchronic and the diachronic view of interpretive conflicts and interpretive history, respectively, are assertions that for any translation of philosophy it is imperative to know philosophy’s history in general (cf. *ibid.*: 148) as well as the history of a given philosophical text’s translations in particular (cf. GONDEK 2000: 215).

Translation scholars on their part evocate the potentially polarized interpretive dynamics when they speak of the attachment of “a domestic range of reference to the foreign text [...] [and] creation of new interpretive possibilities” (VENUTI 1998: 118) as well as when they regard every newly translated text to be bearing the history of its recompositions and the circumstances thereof (cf. ARROJO 2013: 249). Since Benjamin’s emphasis is on conflict-caused interpretive plurality and i.a. the translation instances when it occurs, his framework can be called a poetics of interpretive bifurcation. Note also that the way the scientific discourse speaks in turns (cf. SNELL-HORNBY 2006; BACHMANN-MEDICK 2016) or in “traditions of scientific research” (KUHN 1996: 10) to signify its progress matches this very logic of theoretical, or interpretive, breaches and breakthroughs.

### **Heuristics of Tradition’s Dis/Continuation**

It has been illustrated so far how differently tradition and/in translation in the context of the history of philosophy can be profiled and poeticized. Smirnov and MacIntyre tend to see tradition as a conservative/preservative potency, whereas Nuzzo and Benjamin gravitate to its progressive and metamorphosing effects. Either way, the notion of tradition appears quite plausible or even intrusive in the general context of the history of philosophy and the role of translation in it.

An interesting question arises at this point as to whether or not these poetics qualify for a descriptive approach to one particular philosophical text, its translation or its translator. It appears quite tempting, for instance, to follow up on Nuzzo’s idea that it is in and through translation that a philosophical tradition is unveiled, passed on and transformed. One of the best-known efforts to apply this as a method has been Jacques Derrida’s analysis of Plato’s Pharmacy (cf. DERRIDA / JOHNSON 1981). Derrida’s claim was that the task of unveiling the issues related to *pharmakon*’s translations addressed “nothing less than the problem of the very passage into philosophy” (*ibid.* 72). And he illustrated how, by obliterating the term’s ambiguity and interrupting its citational play (the “anagram”), the translation of *pharmakon* as “remedy” neutralized and lost the implications of a magical, uncontrollable force within the Greek word’s original connotations and collocations and rationalized it eventually in terms of scientific and therapeutic technicality and causality (cf. *ibid.*: 97–98).

Derrida’s unparalleled contribution allows for incorporating other poetics into it, too. Thus, speaking with Smirnov, Derrida’s analysis of *pharmakon*’s dis/continuation was precisely a process of “untying of the tiedness” or a decohesion of the text’s and the term’s referentiality. MacIntyre’s multiseiotic entrenchments and their disruption in this particular case can consequently be paraphrased in Derrida’s terms of textuality and citationality. Finally, Derrida’s analysis demonstrated the emersion of a different interpretive vein just in Benjamin’s sense.

It must be admitted that Derrida's approach gravitated towards a source-oriented translation criticism rather than a target-oriented semiotic-sociological procedure of Descriptive Translation Studies (cf. TOURY 2012). The paratexts as a specific manifestation of the source text's textuality were not singled out either. Now, given the text-analytical potential of the poetics in question, how can the processes they imply be traced and pinned down a) descriptively, i.e. target-oriented and b) in translations' paratexts?

I will venture a move from poetics of tradition to heuristics of its dis/continuation by adopting Smirnov's notion of decohesion to one particular translation or rather its paratexts. I assume, the decohesion as a linguistic, interpretive etc. processing occurs naturally in the mind of the translator during "the most intimate act of reading" (SPIVAK 1992: 181) the translation process is claimed to be. One of the most expedient approaches in this sense was the call to reevaluate the microstructural linguistic analysis when dealing with philosophical translations, i.e. to address and examine their terminological glossaries in particular (HELLER / PAYNE 2019). The recent analysis of the new collaborative translation of *Sein und Zeit* into Italian (HELLER 2020) has demonstrated several interesting instances of the complex entanglements which are touched upon in this paper, too. Interestingly enough, however, the idea of paratextual clues which are supposed to reveal hermeneutic processes (ibid.: 243–247) suggests that such clues can be found not only in glossaries but also in other paratextual forms, although glossaries might indeed present the densest and the most informative paratextual hypostasis in philosophical translations in this regard.

It is thus my hypothesis that what has been called a "tradition" and its dis/continuation can leave its footprint (or traces) in the philosophical translation's entire paratextual frame. Within this frame, I follow Gerard Genette (GENETTE / LEWIN 1997: 344–403) in differentiating between text-immanent peritexts (forewords, afterwords, footnotes etc.) and collateral, private or public, auto- or allobiographic epitexts (interviews, correspondence, diaries, reviews etc.). The decohesion would consequently encompass the whole range of paratextual reflections upon a translated philosophical text in the target-culture, whether they are authored by the translator or her/his commentators or critics.

However poeticized in the above contexts, tradition was indicated in practical terms by translation-assisted interlingual (Nuzzo, Smirnov), intertextual (Nuzzo, MacIntyre), intercultural (or broader: intersemiotic; Nuzzo, Smirnov, MacIntyre), and interpretative (Smirnov, Benjamin) operations, transfers and transformations. Hence, any signs of respective processes, if documented overtly or covertly in paratexts, could be regarded as tradition-indicative or, speaking with Nuzzo, would shed light on transmutations and dis/continuation taken place via and in translation. For a closer examination I will consult the first Russian translation of Martin Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (Russian: *Bytie i vremja*). First, I will provide introductory remarks on the translator-philosopher Vladimir Bibihin (1938–2004) and the assessment of his work which partly constitutes the epitextual environment of this particular translation of his. Subsequently, in the absence of a glossary, I will look for peritextual insights into looked-for processes in his afterword.

### ***Dis/Continuing Russian Heidegger – Epitextual Evidence***

Single chapters from Martin Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* were translated into Russian in the late soviet and the early post-soviet Russia. The first and so far the only full translation was

accomplished by Smirnov's college and fellow-countryman Vladimir Bibihin in 1997. For decades Bibihin worked and lectured at the Department of Philosophy at Lomonosov Moscow State University, authored a number of monographs on philological, philosophical and theological issues, and left a small body of selective philosophical translations.

Interestingly enough, embedding Bibihin into a wider academic and sociocultural context will draw upon references that honor him precisely in terms of a tradition. He is named, for example, "the most prominent religious thinker of the new Russia, [who] continued the tradition of the Russian religious thinking of the early twentieth century" (MRÓWCZYŃSKI-VAN ALLEN, OBOLEVITCH & ROJEK 2016: 156). In the obituary he is claimed to have "belonged to the large European tradition while at the same time remaining essentially a Russian thinker" (MIXAJLOVSKIJ n.d.). Whatever a European tradition in opposition to a Russian one might be, these references reveal that Bibihin can be placed into the sociocultural and sociopolitical context of secularized, post-soviet Russia where Orthodox Christian theology was apparently among his active philosophical interests.

Turning to Bibihin's translations, it must be admitted that they are declared an integral and valuable part in the repertory of Russian-language philosophical translations (cf. OZNOBKINA / MOTROŠILOVA 2006: 632). Nevertheless, they were and remain subject to intense controversies which is definitely the case for his translation of *Sein und Zeit*: The range of criticism varies from appreciating it only as "a stand-alone phenomenon, [intrinsically] Bibihin's piece of work" (ibid.; cf. also 2020)<sup>4</sup>, which can admittedly impair the apprehension of that original piece of classics, to the devastating judgment of a "hair-raisingly" distorted image of Heidegger (DUGIN 2010: 13–14)<sup>5</sup>. More specifically, Dugin, for instance, proposes terminological translations different from Bibihin's by keeping e.g. *Zeit* (time) unchanged in his own translation (in the strange bilingual form of *Zeit-время*) (cf. ibid.: 286–287). Another specific phenomenological point of criticism is Bibihin's translation inconsistency in case of *Entsetzen* and *Angst*, both translated as *ужас* (horror) (cf. SALIN 2019: 156), whereas *Angst* is supposed to gravitate much stronger towards *тревога* (alert, anxiety) (cf. ibid.: 158–160).

In any case, according to a retrospective report on the reception of the western philosophy in present-day Russia (cf. BLAUBERG et al. 2014: 292–293), two renditions of phenomenology in Russia can be distinguished: a Husserlian and a Heideggerian one. Between these two Vladimir Bibihin, among others, represents the latter, whereas Nelly Motrošilova, one of the very critics quoted above, – the former (cf. ibid.). Speaking in terms of the above poetics, these circumstances seem to exemplify and testify for an interpretive conflict within one epistemic area, i.e. phenomenology, which apparently split Russian philosophers into two camps. Inasmuch as terminological discrepancies accompany this conflict, decohering applies equally to terminological and interpretive operations. The Russian Heidegger emerges as a dis/continuation of the original on at least interlingual and interpretive levels against the background of quite concrete sociocultural, epistemic and maybe even ideological (religious, value-based) affiliations. And the translator-philosopher's afterword to which I will turn now bears on its part witness to these affiliations.

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<sup>4</sup>: " [...] перевод 'Бытия и времени' заслуживает особого разговора. Как самостоятельное явление, как работа Бибихина он весьма интересен и ценен" (OZNOBKINA & MOTROŠILOVA 2006: 632).

<sup>5</sup> "[Переводы Бибихина] дают такую картину, от которой волосы становятся дыбом" (DUGIN 2010: 13–14).

**Dis/Continuating Russian Heidegger – Afterword**

Bibihin's four-page afterword to *Bytie i vremja* (cf. HAJDEGGER / BIBIHIN 1997: 448–451) is mostly an informative rather than an apologetic commentary on numerous word choices and is interwoven with references that serve the purpose of underpinning these choices.<sup>6</sup>

Bibihin starts with an extensive quote from Alexander Mikhailov's letter to German philosopher Frithjof Rodi (cf. *ibid.*: 448). Alexander Mikhailov, a Russian scholar of philology, culture and literature, translated a chapter from *Sein und Zeit* in 1993 and shares his thoughts on translation of philosophy in his letter. This first reference seems to testify to Bibihin's and his translator-colleges' translational attitudes and provide a legitimization for the decisions he is going to share. This impression is reinforced as soon as arbitrariness in treating foreign philosophy in Russia is alleged and then opposed in favor of "correct" translation rules of Saints Cyril and Methodius, the inventors of the Cyrillic alphabet (cf. *ibid.*: 449).<sup>7</sup> Whichever these rules are (they are not specified), it can be held that Bibihin reveals right from the outset in whose "tradition" he seeks to step into and to whose authority he claims his loyalty. A brief overview might demonstrate even more clearly how further credits and references as well as precedent logic back up Bibihin's word choices (cf. HAJDEGGER / BIBIHIN 1997: 449–450):

Translation of *Angst* as *ужас* (horror), rather than *тревога* (alert, anxiety) or *тоска* (yearning, boredom), in the translation anthology *Vremja i bytie* from 1993 justifies it being left unmodified. Religious philosopher Vasily Rozanov's usage of *лежит* (lies, is situated) as copular verb (which is unusual in Russian) in his *O ponimanii* justifies the translation of *liegt* with *лежит*. The poetic, almost Russophile description of the etymological core *собъ* within *собственное* (own) by Russian lexicographer and ethnographer Vladimir Dal ensures the proper translation of *eigene* as *собственное*. Finally, the translation of *Dasein* as *присутствие* (presence; cf. Dugin's *вот-бытие*, (DUGIN 2010: 364)) is warranted by a series of facts: contextual references to Jacques Derrida's and Jean-Paul Sartre's *présence* (and its translations into Russian/German); a case where in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's lines *Dasein* was translated as *присутствие*; and the usage of *присутствие* by Soviet-Georgian philosopher Merab Mamardashvili. The latter, by the way, equally belongs to the Heideggerian interpretation of phenomenology (cf. BLAUBERG et al. 2014: 293). What is genuinely surprising in this context is that the final decision in favor of *присутствие* was prompted by the words of an anonymous Orthodox priest about "bearing the truth not only by words, but by one's whole presence" (HAJDEGGER / BIBIHIN 1997: 450).

These examples provide convincing evidence of Bibihin's sociocultural, academic and epistemic socializations and their imprint on his translation decisions. Within the latter,

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. the intertwinings between philosophical terms' intercultural, conceptual and argumentative histories in the context of Russian philosophy as exemplified by the term "person" and its translation (PLOTNIKOV 2017).

<sup>7</sup> "Утомляясь от своеволия, сделавшегося у нас привычным в отношении к 'зарубежной' философии, мы все больше убеждаемся в верности переводческих правил Кирилла и Мефодия" HAJDEGGER / BIBIHIN (1997: 449). Note that there is a palaeoslavistic study of Saints Cyril and Methodius' evangelical translations which is claimed to have assisted the formation of the first Slavic literary language (VEREŠČAGIN 1971). Bibihin's credits could have been granted to this study and to the Saints' rather literal translation principles (cf. *ibid.*: 181).

terminological and etymological considerations go hand in hand with justificatory intertextual references, clues and borrowings. The paratextual environment of Bibihin's translation demonstrates clearly how intertwined interlingual, intertextual, intersemiotic, and interpretative operations, transfers and transformations within the presumed shift of a "tradition" in and through translation can be. Bibihin's decisions have been selectively verified in the translation proper, so that it can be claimed that the multifaceted shifts he reveals in the afterword are concealed across his version of *Sein und Zeit* and represent what we might call a dis/continuation of the original.

What can be illustrated in conclusion as quite emblematic of this shift is the translation of a term related to tradition and dis/continuation through semantics of temporality: Thus, quite on the literal basis of the *time*'s verb formations (*Zeit* – *zeitigen*, время – *временить*), German *zeitigen* (to bring forth/about, to result in) is translated by Bibihin as *временить* (to delay, to temporize) and, despite of the strikingly different meaning of the verb, reasoned as basically the incomplete reverse side of the same process. In this manner, the prospective maturation of *zeitigen* transmutes (in quite perceptible sense of the word) into the lingering flair of *временить*.<sup>8</sup>

## Conclusion

The analysis of the selected authors' thoughts on the history of philosophy revealed different patterns of metaphorizing and poeticizing tradition and translation. Etymologically interconnected, both terms were almost unanimously called for to reflect both consistency and change that polarize the evolution of philosophical thinking. At the same time the approaches varied considerably in prioritizing either one or the other pole as well as different associated aspects and processes which have been summarized under dis/continuation, systemic coherency, multisemiotic entrenchment and interpretive bifurcation. Translation's roles within these frameworks were related to linguistic, textual, semiotic and interpretive operations.

The attempt to uncover these operations in the first Russian translation of *Sein und Zeit* by consulting its paratextual environment showed its translators-philosopher in the role of a tradition-bearer, tradition-mediator and tradition-modifier who brought along a unique socialization that testified for his "personal idiosyncrasies, the individual signatures, that are stamped on particular terms or conceptual devices" (RÉE 2001: 230). Indicators of a tradition and its dis/continuation in the analyzed case appeared to be i.a. semantics, etymology and terminology (interlingual aspect); intertextual references, credits and borrowings

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<sup>8</sup> It must be admitted that, although not specified in the afterword, this translation detail applies to particular sections only (§§ 61–68). Cf. in Russian "Временность может себя в различных возможностях и разным способом *временить*" (HAJDEGGER / BIBIHIN 1997: 304) for the original sentence "Zeitlichkeit kann sich in verschiedenen Möglichkeiten und in verschiedener Weise *zeitigen*" (HEIDEGGER 1967: 304) which is translated into English as follows: "Temporality has different possibilities and different ways of *temporalizing* itself" (HEIDEGGER / MACQUARRIE / ROBINSON 2001: 351). In the indicated sections, Heidegger is supposed to play on etymology of *Zeit* and *zeitigen* rather than targeting the meaning of *zeitigen* itself, hence the English translators' opting for *temporalize* (cf. *ibid.*: 351). This circumstance might also have been Bibihin's reason to tolerate the semantic shift caused by *временить*.

(intertextual aspect); sociocultural, ideological or ethical imprints and backgrounds (intersemiotic aspect); epistemic and interpretive affiliations, variations and antagonisms (interpretive aspect).

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