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Trust-based translation history. Guideline questions and an illustration.

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Abstract

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Abstract

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My Melbourne colleague Andrea Rizzi is the founder of trust-based translation history (in Rizzi, Lang and Pym, 2019). I am pleased to participate in the project for several simple reasons. First, "trust" is a short word and stands a good chance of being remembered. Second, the general lack of trust in contemporary social institutions in the West (although not in China, it seems) opens up a wide range of social inquiries of which translation history should be a part, alongside several other disciplines. And third, a focus on trust might keep translation history from becoming boring: few neighboring disciplines are going to be excited if all we can show are lists of dates, names, and works. There are, however, several more complex reasons for focusing on trust. My aim here is to offer them by way of an explanation of the general approach. I will then formulate a guideline set of questions and present a case study of how those questions might be answered.

Basic questions for beginner historians

The first things a historian has to know are the ones formulated in a probably simpler world: Who?, What?, Where?, When?, and How? (attributed to Aristotle, among others, see Sloane 2010). Those are what one might call the archeological questions, the ones producing data on demographics, space, time and hopefully technologies.[1] Those questions are mostly fixed on moments of *production*: we wonder who carried out what translation where and how; we only ask about translators and their products. We might nevertheless also ask about clients, publishers, financers, publishers, distributors, and translation users of all kinds, all operating in various networks. The questions can thus be extended to: With whom?, For whom?, According to whom?, and most importantly in a context of interpersonal relations, Why?

Trust-based history proposes that there are some engaging answers to be found with respect to this latter set of questions. For example, we can imagine some general initial responses: Why does a translation decision go one way rather than another? Possible answer: In order to gain or maintain trust. With whom do translators work? Possibly: With those they trust. For whom do they work? For those who trust them. And so on. Such deceptively factitious responses point to the key role played by trust in maintaining translation-related networks. They also sketch out an initial conceptualization of trust as an unverified belief that someone has done (or will do) what they purport to have done (or do). In the Western tradition[2], translators have prototypically been seen as seeking trust through an implicit "commissive act" (TYMOCZKO 1999: 110), in effect a promise of representation: "I hereby promise that this text represents the original in some relevant way" (CHESTERMAN 2001: 149). If a client or receiver then trusts a translator, for example without consulting alternative translators, they are participating in the commissive act. If not, degrees of distrust come into play.

Trust is thus the glue that sticks translation relations together, forming networks, just as distrust is the solvent that can break relations down. Trust also forms chains, turning small networks into larger historical formations: production connects with distribution and reception, and then with further production (re-editions, revisions, re-translations), not just in the frame experienced by initial translators but also ricocheting down through history, growing into networks of readers, revisers, editors, publishers, re-translators, critics and any other receivers that may participate in the re-

[1] This is not to denigrate the importance of these questions or the absolute necessity of doing translation archeology, which remains "a fascinating field that often involves complex detective work, great self-sacrifice and very real service to other areas of translation history" (PYM 1998/2014: 5). There is no truth in the rumor (found in PINILLA & LÉPINETTE 2015: 21-22) that a focus on translators somehow seeks to sideline or exclude the compiling of lists: it is a matter of asking interesting questions in order to motivate the corpora and catalogues. More pointedly, the compiling of lists should itself be seen as a trust-based activity, since the identification and categorization of translations is a complex ideological process that involves negotiating numerous doubts (see, for example, POUPAUD, PYM & TORRES-SIMÓN 2009).

[2] The promise is not made in the same way in all translation regimes: it remains prevalent in much of Western translation since the Renaissance but is only fleetingly operative in pre-Modern translation practice in most parts of the world. Other kinds of commissive acts may come into play, such as an undertaking to entertain, to instruct or to support a particular community. Those different kinds of trust are building blocks in various institutionalizations of translation.

produced commissive act, including historians, who are also readers of translations and producers of knowledge about translations. That is, we historians are also playing in the relations of trust and distrust; we are not wholly external to what we describe. Indeed, we also ask for trust in our own commissive acts, since we purport to represent the past in some relevant way. In this, a focus on trust meets up with reflexive translation studies and some of the tenets of actor-network theory (PYM 2007).
Here, then, are some basic questions that can be asked when doing translation history, embracing the dimensions just mentioned:

Why does the translator trust the start text?
Who trusts the translator? Who does the translator trust?
How did the translator gain trust? How could that trust be lost?
How do specific translation decisions maintain trust?
Why does the historian trust the data?
Who trusts the historian?

These questions are mere launching pads for inquiry. They become complex in several ways: actual or potential distrust shadows trust at every step; the individual translator or historian is a reductive illusion since there are many possible communication partners at each node; the ways translators are trusted are profoundly historical (they are what is to be discovered); translator status is subject to highly variable conceptualization; the trust concept is itself similarly historical (HOSKING 2014). But let's keep things easy: questions and models are needed here to kick-start research.
Before using an extended example to suggest how these questions can hold together, let me say a few words about why they should be of particular interest to translation history.

A few principles of trust-based translation history

Trust clearly concerns relations between people: the translator with a client, with a receiver, with an author, with other translators, or indeed with any number of people and voices in the scene of translation and its networks. To that extent, trust goes along with the tendency to look at people rather than texts; we might more exactly be talking about trust-based *translator* history, calqued on "translator studies" (CHESTERMAN 2009). I nevertheless stay with the wider term "*translation* history" because, as noted, there are many people other than translators involved, and then, after all, we still have to talk about texts, and indeed about the relative trust invested in texts: I trust the translator, and *therefore* I trust that these words represent what was said in a foreign language, perhaps in a distant land, in the more or less remote past. Trust is firstly in people, even when it is then invested in texts.
Trust is of particular concern to translators because their trade mostly obliges them to deal with things to which non-translators have less access: translators usually know the foreign language more than do those who request or use the translation. More formally, to the extent that translation concerns mediated interlingual and cross-

cultural acts, it tends to involve asymmetric information (the person trusting a translator knows less than the translator about some things) and exceptionally reduced direct knowledge of the thing being represented (when there is no access to the foreign text without translators). Although an element of trust is involved in all social transactions, trust is particularly involved in the case of translation, as a matter of degree if not nature. As Chesterman (1997: 182) puts it, "[t]ranslators, in order to survive as translators, must be trusted by all parties involved, both as a profession and individually. [...] Without this trust, the profession would collapse, and so would its practice".
Seen in that light, what translators sell is not just a particular number of words but also the *trustworthiness* of those words. This should be all the more true in an age of usable machine translation, where the production of translations can be virtually free but the reliability of a particular translation in a high-risk situation requires trust in an expert.

So why should anyone trust a translator? To pursue the normalizing assumptions, it is more cost-efficient to trust a translator than it is to learn the foreign language and culture for yourself, or indeed to employ several translators to check on each other. In this sense we might refer to Luhmann's description of trust as a mechanism for reducing complexity (1968), assuming that the labyrinths of texts in unknown languages form a kind of complexity that some people pay to have reduced. The more complex the communication, the greater the need for trust: we have to trust lawyers to read the language of laws for us, doctors to read the language of medical research, and translators to read the foreign languages we are similarly not skilled in. Once we trust the mediator, complexity is reduced.[3]

Trust thus offers us a way of looking at the translator's work in historical situations. It operates an assumption that may or may not be true: if the translation is done in a particular way, if the translator adopts particular strategies, it is ostensibly in order to gain or maintain a certain kind of trust from someone, and may sometimes be to betray that trust.

Concepts of trust and distrust enable certain interesting hypotheses to be formulated about translation history. We might, for example, pick up the distinction between "thick trust" as the kind that develops when we know a person very well, in many aspects of social life, and "thin trust" as the kind that is relatively one-dimensional, for example when we trust a translator because they have a certain professional or academic qualification or they come from a particular social group but we know nothing else about them (see Hosking 2014: 46–49; Rizzi et al. 2019). The historical professionalization of translation might then be seen a general movement from thick to thin trust. Most especially, the twentieth century saw growth in systems of training,

[3] That logic does not apply in all situations, of course; there is no fatality. When Ezra Pound starts the *Cantos* by referring to and translating from a sixteenth-century translation of Homer ("Lie quiet Divus. I mean, that is, Andreas Divus, / In officina Wecheli, 1538, out of Homer"), he is clearly interested in *how* the previous translator worked, not in how trustworthy the translator might have been in fulfilling a commissive act. The aesthetic appreciation of translations is always possible, indeed praiseworthy, but that is not what makes them translations.

examinations, and associations that give signals of professional status (Pym et al. 2012), which we can now describe as signals of "thin" trustworthiness. The need to rely on such signals, rather than on knowledge of the translator as a whole person, is further pronounced when electronic networks reduce our communication partners to a mere online presence: we move towards "thin trust".

Risk management and trust

There are, however, various ways of thinking about trust. For Abdallah (2011: 140), translators can only properly enter into relations of trust when "the perspectives and interests of each stakeholder are addressed, knowledge is shared, and information is clear" (cf. Abdallah & Koskinen 2007: 677-678). That seems to be a rather particular notion of trust, raising the bar so high that very few can reach up to it. After all, if everything were already known to everyone, there would be no reason for trust, no complexity to be reduced, no problematic asymmetry, nothing to accept unverified. What Abdallah is describing seems more like familiarity as a basis for relative confidence that the promise will be fulfilled.

For me (and here I part slightly with Rizzi et al. 2019, as well as with Abdallah 2011), trust in general does not necessarily require familiarity. This is not only because thin trust is a trait of growing professionalization. It is also because trust in general operates when there is a *risk* of incompetence or betrayal of some kind: the greater the difference between what you know and what your translator knows, the more reduced your access to the foreign, the less control you have and the greater the risk that the translator may be incompetent, disloyal or unable to reduce complexity to suit your interests. This is described when a later Luhmann (1988: 95) makes a useful distinction between confidence (*Zuversicht*) and trust (*Vertrauen*). If we simply have confidence that the translator will do well because all past translators with the same background have done well, then that is a question of accrued familiarity allowing a certain optimistic hope. It need not concern an act of trust. Trust, on the other hand, occurs when a specific risk is recognized and a decision is made to deal with that risk by trusting someone. In that sense, Luhmann sees trust not just as a reduction of complexity but also as "a solution for specific problems of risk" (1988: 95). Or as Giddens (1990: 33) puts it, trust is always "in a certain sense blind trust".

This connection with risk may prove useful when we try to explain why a translator opts for one strategy rather than another, or why people choose to trust one translator rather than another. It is not my purpose here to spell out all those connections, since our focus is on trust. Suffice to say that risk management is a very rich and highly developed field, offering intriguing models for all tastes. It enables us to talk not just about maintaining the translator's credibility, but also the logics of text-level decisions and tendencies, the risks of communicative failure in each specific situation, and the history of translator dispositions (risk-averse, risk-transferring, risk-taking) (cf. Pym 2015a).

Trust is thus a part of risk management, admittedly an important and irreplaceable part, but just one part nevertheless. Whenever we move outward from the observation of trust or distrust, whenever we are looking for reasons why trust was extended in one way rather than another, it is not trust itself that can provide explanations. When we want to know about why someone or something was trusted, we have to ask about the relative risks involved, about the alternative trust relations available, and about the potential causes of communicative failure.

And so to a little history.

Illustration: Enzinas presents his New Testament

My illustration comes from an encounter that I have described previously (Pym 2000, 2016a), so there is little archeological originality on offer. It is also from a field in which I claim no particular expertise: it first came to me as a story in Spanish history books (initially in Menéndez y Pelayo 1952-53: 2.17), which I chose to trust, more or less (although not entirely without checking[4]). Here I present the bare bones merely in order to show what kind of history a focus on trust might produce.

Who?, What?, Where?, When?, and How?

Francisco de Enzinas was also known as Dryander, Duchesne, Eichmann, and Van Eyck, as he translated his name into the various languages with which he worked. That in itself might arouse suspicion. Who was he hiding his true name from? My interest in him here is due to his translation of the New Testament from Greek into Spanish. The translation was printed in Antwerp and presented in Brussels on 21 November 1543 to no less than Holy Roman Emperor Charles or Karel or Karl or Carolus V (Carlos I of Spain), who was also a polyglot with as many names as languages (his first languages were French and Dutch, so here we will call him a French "Charles" *faute de mieux*). The translator's names were those of a traveler fleeing across languages; Charles' names came from his uniting of languages, thrones and thus power.The narrative of their encounter comes with a short dialogue:

> Charles: "Are you the author?"
> Francisco: "The Holy Spirit is the author. I am only its faithful servant and weak instrument."

And so Francisco hands Charles the New Testament, where the title page does actually say, in big letters, "Habla Dios" (God Speaks). This could be a translator's classical evasion of responsibility: Don't blame me, I'm just the messenger – the one you have to trust is God, who is speaking here in the text.

What happens next depends a lot on who is actually trusting whom, who controls the speech of God, and to what degree.

[4] Further sources are Enzinas himself, who in *De statu belgico* (1545/1991) recounts the circumstances of the translation and its printing, Nelson (1999), who compares this with other documents from the period, and Bergua Cavero (2006), who offers a sociological reading of Enzinas's work.

Why does the translator trust the start text?

Asking about the translator trusting the text to be translated might seem fatuous. Surely the text is there as a given? Indeed it is in many cases these days, to the extent that questions of "upstream" trust, the kind that goes back in time from the moment of translating, may seem irrelevant. In pre-print translation projects, however, the first step was very much to establish the text: one went around collecting as many manuscripts as possible, selecting the most reliable or contrasting the variants until a text was established as a reliable point of departure for the translating as such. The practice partly reappears these days when we grapple with constantly changing texts like websites and software. It is also part and parcel of the technologies that allow simultaneous translation and text production, such that the translator first has to be sure that they are starting from the right place (hence the term "start text" for the one they start translating from – there are few absolute "sources" around).

In the case of Enzinas, this work has mostly been done for him. He is translating from Erasmus's *Novum Instrumentum* of 1516, where a Greek New Testament has been established on the basis of variant manuscripts. Enzinas might also have worked from the Greek established in the Complutensian Polyglot or Alcalá Bible, coordinated by Cardenal Cisneros in Spain and published in 1514-17. Both have appeared more than thirty years ago. Why choose one or the other? Which should be trusted?

At the time of Enzinas's translating, this need not be a question of pitting the incipient Protestantism of Erasmus entirely against the fervent Catholicism of Cisneros. Erasmus's Greek has been authorized by Rome; he is circulated and read in Spain; he has publicly proclaimed that his purpose is *not* to undermine the authority of the Vulgate (see the letter from Erasmus to Maarten Lips, 7 May 1518, in Robinson 1997: 66). Erasmus has actually been translated into Castilian since 1511; Spain is one of the few countries where his works have circulated freely for a while; the young Felipe II has been brought up reading him; Cardinal Cisneros has even invited the Rotterdam scholar to the Universidad de Alcalá. Erasmus has declined –'Non placet Hispania'–, although he might perhaps have accepted had Hispanic learning not generally opted to work in Castilian rather than Latin. Erasmus instead taught in Paris and Leuven, which is where Enzinas happened to study.

In 1543, then, shared philological concerns might still have enabled some kind of tenuous trust between Erasmians and the linguists around Cisneros in Spain. As yet, there was no prohibition of Bible translations in the vernacular (this would ensue from the Council of Trent, which will not start until 1545). That much might be assumed from Francisco's offering of his translation to Charles: the text itself, freshly rendered from authorized Greek, might even be enough to have him trusted as a translator. Enzinas certainly expects resistance from some of the clergy around Charles, but he seems to think the emperor could be swayed.[5] He is clearly prepared to take the risk.

[5] "Knowing the temperament of my people, I did not doubt that there would be certain Spaniards in the emperor's court who would be less favourable toward the appearance at that time of the

Who trusts/distrusts the translator?

Enzinas thus arrives with the authority of scholarship; he knows his Greek; he knows theology. He is actually from a family that has become wealthy in the wool trade, so he was originally sent to Leuven to study commerce. He then fell under the spell of scholarship and turned his economic capital into cultural capital, as we might say with Bourdieu. And now, speaking to Charles, he wants to convert his cultural capital into social capital, a very big bit of social capital – he wants to win the emperor to his cause.

Enzinas must know, however, that there is more than a little risk associated with the translation project – risk to life, for a start. Although it is still legal to render the Bible into Spanish, a group of Lutherans were arrested in Leuven almost at the same time as Enzinas arrived there and some of them were put to death (NELSON 1999). The translation might be legal, but Lutheranism is being punished. So does Charles choose to trust the translator? Not much: he immediately has Enzinas imprisoned in Brussels. So much for the credibility of God speaking in the text and the authority of scholarship! One doubts Charles has much time to actually read the translation, so that would perhaps not be the prime reason for the imprisonment. Then again, if he has bothered to glance at the text, he must have seen that some passages are in capital letters, which is not normal for Bibles. Which passages? Here is a litmus-test example:

> *Adonde esta pues la gloria? Echada es fuera. Por qual ley? Por las obras? No, sino por la ley de la fee. CONCLVIMOS PVES QUE EL HOMBRE ES IUSTIFICADO POR LA FEE, SIN LAS OBRAS DE LA LEY. (Romans 3: 27-29)*
>
> *[Where then is glory? It is excluded. By what law? By works? No, but by the law of faith. WE THUS CONCLUDE THAT MAN IS JUSTIFIED BY FAITH, WITHOUT THE WORKS OF THE LAW.]*[6]

Why should this quite complicated piece of theological reasoning culminate in capitals? Because, as Charles should have ample reason to know, it corresponds to perhaps the most famous of the passages for which Luther was accused of mistranslating the Biblical text:

> *So halten wyrs nu/das der mensch gerechtfertiget werde / on zu thun der werk des gefetzs / allein durch den glauben (Romans 3: 28)*
>
> *[So we maintain / that the person is justified / without doing the work of the law / through faith alone.]*

Enzinas uses capitals to highlight the Protestant argument against the economic practices of the Church, receiving donations ("works") in exchange for justification (or "indulgences"). True, he does not follow Luther in adding the word "solo" (for "al-

heavenly doctrine than what its dignity demanded." (ENZINAS 1545/1991: 47, trans. by NELSON 1999: 99).

[6] If not noted otherwise, the translations in square brackets are by the author.

lein", only, sola), which is not actually in the Greek he is working from (χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου). The provocation is nevertheless clear enough and quite in-your-face: this is a translation of Protestant inspiration.

Why should Charles be aware of what is going on? In late 1543, just prior to receiving Enzinas's Bible, he has received news that Antwerp is full of "the false liberties of Luther" and that a Bible translation is being revised there (Nelson 1999: 98). Enzinas is very much part of that dissident milieu, both in Flanders and in the heartland of Lutheranism: he has been enrolled at the University of Wittenberg since 1541, where his trust in Erasmus extended to trust in the German Hellenist Melanchthon. And it is actually in Melanchthon's house that he has finished his Spanish translation of the Bible. Melanchthon, of course, has been collaborating closely with Luther. And Luther has published his German New Testament in 1522 and his complete Bible translation in 1534.

Now, Charles is very likely to connect up all those dots because, some twelve years previously, in 1521, he saw Luther himself standing in front of him during the *Reichstag* ("diet") in Worms. Luther famously refused to renounce his views; he was promptly excommunicated by the Pope; but Charles nevertheless made sure that the German heretic had 21 days for safe passage back to Wittenberg.

Now with Enzinas standing in front of him, Charles knows the same thing has to happen (doesn't Francisco?) and he perhaps comes up with the same political solution: Enzinas is locked up but, as noted, he escapes from his Brussels prison in February 1545. Did Charles decide to let him go? Trust could not be established, yet there was perhaps some complicit understanding nevertheless.

So why did Enzinas present his Bible to the emperor? As a plea for trust in scholarship, it was a gamble, but essentially the same gamble had made Christianity the religion of Rome, in the age of Constantine the Great. There were ample precedents for the risk-taking. As Pascal (1660) would insist in the following century, when the rewards are great, then it is logical to take very high risks. Evangelists have been doing crazy things forever.

Now, why might the emperor have let the translator get away? One suspects that at this stage he was seeking to build a greater Europe and thus had no personal interest in over-alienating Lutherans (this is a point on which I have to trust other historians – it is a complicated period).

And why did Charles not accept the new translation as such, since he would later be open to negotiating with Protestant princes? Because, one might venture, his own power was dependent on that of the Church, which had given him his crown: he was *Holy Roman* Emperor, after all – it's in the name. And the Church claimed that God spoke through Rome, not through Enzinas.

The translator's ploy never really stood much chance.

How did the translator gain trust? How could trust be lost?

So Enzinas escapes to Antwerp and then Wittenberg (not hiding his Protestant colors), then Strasbourg, Constance, and Cambridge, where he teaches Greek. He later moves to Strasbourg and Geneva, where he dies in 1552 while preparing a complete edition of his Bible in Spanish.

Although the translator certainly gained trust because of his general scholarship (being invited to teach at Cambridge, among much else), his movements were mainly within a particularly Protestant network of scholars and printers, now quite separate from the scholars around Cisneros. It was for part of that network that he translated not just the New Testament into Spanish, but also Luther's *De libertate cristiana*, at least (he names himself in the prologue as Elao, "oak"). His imprisonment in Brussels marked the end of any possible cooperation with the Church. The scission is further marked in 1546 (three years after the Bible presentation) when Enzinas's brother Jaime is burnt at the stake in Rome for heresy. Not surprisingly, in *De statu belgico* (1545/1991) Enzinas openly criticizes the Inquisition.

Once trust is lost, it is completely lost (as football club managers know: they have to trust their coaches entirely, up to the moment when they do not trust them at all): any possibility of interdenominational understanding based on scholarship and personal contact gave way to a Europe of opposed religions.

How do specific translation decisions maintain (or lose) trust?

We have seen that Enzinas's use of capital letters was not particularly designed to meet the Church half-way. His style was confrontational, ensuring that he would be trusted by Protestants and distrusted by Catholics. His Spanish translation then created a certain tradition, being lent on in Casiodoro de Reina's Spanish translation of the New Testament, published as part of the complete *Biblia del Oso* in 1569 and revised by Valera in 1602. And that Reina-Valera translation virtually remained *the* Protestant Bible in Spanish right through to the twentieth century, functioning rather like the King James Version in English.

That is, Enzinas's loss of trust with respect to the Church of Rome was at the same time a condition for his contribution to a long history of translation that was highly trusted among Spanish-speaking Protestants. The trust he lost with respect to Charles was compensated for in the centuries that followed.

Why does the historian trust the data?

As I retell this story, I am very aware that my view of it is not that of others. As mentioned, I first read about Enzinas in Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, specifically in his *Historia de los heterodoxos españoles* (History of Spanish Dissenters) (1952-53), first published in 1880–82). This huge work collects all the non-Catholic thinkers the historian could find and virtually declares them to be alien to the true nature of Spanish culture. That is, for Menéndez y Pelayo, translators like Enzinas were not to be trusted – they were on the wrong side of history. The strange thing is that Menéndez y Pelayo, in order to garner some details on the renegade translator, would have had to trust what Enzinas himself had to say about his life and translations, notably in *De statu belgico*, published in French in 1558 and in Latin in the nineteenth century (García Pinilla & Nelson 2001) and in the letters studied by Boehmer (1874: 143-167). So how did he read a text from the other side? What kind of trust was this?

Similarly, when I first came across this story, should I really have trusted the Catholic nationalist historian? Probably not all his adjectives inspired equal confidence, but in this case the basic archeology (names, dates, works, places) had no real reason to be questioned: this was a story worth chasing up. At one point, Menéndez y Pelayo affirms that faith has nothing to fear from shining light on *all* the facts, be they good or bad, and he certainly assembled facts with curious passion.[7] Indeed, Menéndez y Pelayo writes with something like a chief detective's secret fascination with the criminals: they may be on the opposite side of the law, but they are the more lively side, after all. And I suspect it is with a similar mix of fascination and vigilance that I now read Menéndez y Pelayo and he read Enzinas: across the ideological boundaries, one does find some common ground in the basic facts, and scholarship does bring in some basic rules of play. In this case, the trust is not necessarily of the "all or nothing" kind: one extends the benefit of the doubt, and checks when necessary. The availability of objects and information in the present is never gratuitous: the forces of Catholic Spanish culture have brought these data to me, making them more available than several hundred other lost histories, just as the forces of Protestantism have relayed the other side of the story. So one trusts tentatively, here with awareness and vigilance.

Given the many different fields involved in translation history, the need to rely on historians in other disciplines is inevitable, as noted above. It is a feature of our interdisciplinarity. Yet here, too, trust can be the key to getting it right: compare and contrast, and do not commit on first impression alone. And just as we figure out who to trust, other historians will hopefully be asking similar questions of us. We must learn to speak to them and to earn their trust.[8]

Who trusts the historian?

I write this story as someone brought up as a Protestant. So when Enzinas confronts the Inquisition, I tend to be on his side, emotionally if not intellectually. There can be little neutrality in the writing of such history, and there is no great need for neutrality: as long as the project is set up in such a way that the data can respond to our questions, as long as our inclinations and hopes stand a chance of being defeated, as long

[7] "[…] porque el catolicismo, que es todo luz, odia las tinieblas y ninguna verdad puede ser hostil a la Verdad Suma" (1952-53: 1.56). ["[…] because Catholicism, which is all light, detests darkness and no truth can be hostile to the Supreme Truth".]

[8] Yes, I have relied on dates given by other historians, and I have been wrong to do so. In this, historiography is rather like translations, where a few otherwise inconsequential mistakes can indeed lead to a loss of trust in a whole text. But that complete loss of trust is not infrequently motivated by other, more powerful drives such as when one group of historians claim ownership of a certain stretch of history: Spanish translation history is supposed to be for Spaniards to know about, just as Russian history is for Russians, and an intruder is supposedly more likely to get things wrong and thus deserves no credibility (Pym 2015b). So an intruder can only correct the dates, learn to distrust more, and continue.

as there is some element of falsifiability involved (see Pym 2016b), our research can become a legitimate part of ongoing conversations.

It might be argued that, in order to win the trust of others, our histories should feign neutrality or otherwise retreat into reems of archeological data where all bias becomes concealed. I am not so sure. Conversations can be established between participants who are not afraid to show they have something to say, albeit perhaps not to the same extent as Enzinas. And as mentioned, it is possible to establish trust in basic data even despite extreme ideological divides. Sometimes it is especially necessary to do so.

In the case of Hispanic culture, this principle is of special importance. Once the emperor followed the Church rather than critical scholarship, the path was open for a culture of extreme control over cross-cultural communication. The Council of Trent (1545-63) prohibited most vernacular Bibles; in 1558-59 Felipe II issued an index of prohibited books; special licenses were needed to import books; restrictions were placed on Spanish students attending foreign universities. From 1531 there was rigorous censorship of all books sent to the Spanish colonies. Then, if you take the long view of Hispanic history, you see the culture of control going hand-in-hand with the physical expulsion of racially different or dissenting groups: Jews from 1492, Moriscos from 1609, Jesuits in 1767, supporters of the French Revolution in 1814, Liberals in 1824, Republicans in 1949. Many of these expelled groups included translators, or at least intellectuals who became translators once they had to make a living in new lands.

Faced with that kind of track record, I am inclined to lament precisely the tradition that is overtly supported by Menéndez y Pelayo. I am culturally suspicious of translation histories focused on the *Siglos de Oro*, the Golden Centuries, when the vitality of Spanish theater fed on translations from French, for example, but the Spain of the dissenters was virtually hidden. And that means that I might be trusted by a few, but certainly not by all.

Nevertheless, just as I picked up this story relying on a nationalist Catholic, so one might hope that nationalist translation historians can engage in dialogue across the secular scission.

Where to go from here?

What kinds of methodological questions might be of particular interest to trust-based translation history? I close with a few suggestions.

We live in an age where many translation concepts extend beyond the representational basis that the Western tradition has had since the Renaissance. Once we leave behind the printed page, once the electronic text becomes quickly mutable, the nature of trust seems to change and new forms of translation arise, extending to adaption, rewriting, transcreation, and correspondingly hybrid professions. What actual effect does this have on trust relations? Is the material technology really the prime cause? And then, what about all the other translational activities beyond the Western tradition, including recitative epic traditions, publicity, social media, and any of the myriad practices these days called cultural translation? How is trust working there? Those are interesting questions to tackle, and there is no reason why the kind of trust we find in sixteenth-century Bible translating should be operative anywhere else. As noted, trust itself is historical.

These problems also have a properly theoretical dimension. Here is one of the most vexing technical questions of our day: When does a translation cease to be a translation? An answer might be: When no question of trust with respect to an anterior text is at issue. As noted, if a reception is simply concerned with the aesthetics of a text, then that text needs no necessary status as a translation. Of course, that does not mean that the historian refuses to look at things other than translations. In our account of Enzinas, for example, it is of considerable importance that he was a scholar of Greek and was able to gain trust through his work as a scholar; it is important that he had enough status and agency to be able to speak to the emperor about his translation. But he earns a place in translation history precisely because he sought trust as a translator.

Questions about trust might also help with the mechanics of periodization and geographical limitation. Wakabayashi (2019: 31), for instance, seeks guidelines for periodization. For trust-based translation history, the only guide one really needs lies in the questions themselves: you ask, you find possible answers, and then you keep asking, and the object of knowledge grows its own spatiotemporal dimensions in the process (cf. induction in Pym 1998/2014). In this, trust-based history shares much with actor-network theory: you follow the links wherever they take you, and there is no need at all to respect the geographical borders of nations or the artificial numbers of chronology. The questions themselves can connect the micro with the macro, the history with the historian, and translation history with our neighboring scholars. But don't trust me: just ask the questions and see where they lead.

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